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1Iran’s Islamic Revolution
The Ulama, the West, Nationalism, and the Growth of Political Consciousness
by Alexander von Nordheim
candidate for M. Phil in Iranian Studies
This dissertation seeks to offer an explanation for the Islamic Revolution, taking into 
account not only the social, political, and economic conditions of the time, but also 
religious and cultural elements. It seeks to determine the origins of the trends it 
identifies as important to an understanding of the causes of the Islamic Revolution. 
These include the rise of nationalism, Iran’s exploitation by foreign powers, and the 
assertive posture of the Shi’a ulama.
2The names of many individuals, places, and concepts explored in this dissertation are 
transliterations from Arabic and Persian. Therefore, some allowance should be made for 
discrepancies between the spelling of these names in the text and in the quotes. For 
example, Shi’a has been rendered by some of the sources here as: Shi’i, Shi’iah, etc.
Also, the terms ‘Iranian Revolution’ and ‘Islamic Revolution’ are used interchangeably 
here to reflect that the term ‘Islamic Revolution’ is challenged by some circles.
Introduction: Islam and Nationalism in the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979
How the increasing penetration of Iran by foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries weakened 
the monarchy, and led to the growth of nationalism and the increasing assertiveness of Iran’s 
Shi’a clergy in political matters
Over the course of the years from 1977 to 1979, a wide variety of groups from diverse 
ends of the political spectrum came together and accomplished what few would have 
thought possible only a few short years earlier: they successfully overthrew the Imperial 
Pahlavi dynasty of Iran and forced the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to flee the 
country. Most of the groups forming the coalition can be roughly divided into one of 
three categories, albeit with some degree of overlap: republican, leftist, and Islamist. 
Importantly, however, almost all of these groups could be labeled nationalist to some 
degree, a point to which we will return in later chapters.
What followed after the fall of the regime was a brief experiment with a transitional 
government while the leading groups behind the revolution jockeyed for position. In the 
end, it was the Islamists who prevailed. A referendum was held in March of 1979 to 
determine whether the monarchy should be succeeded by an Islamic Republic, without 
3an alternative having been offered. It was passed, overwhelmingly, with 98% of the 
vote. A second referendum, passed in the fall of the same year, ratified a constitution 
that effectively delivered control of all branches of government into the hands of the 
Shi’a clergy. Led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a vociferous critic of both the Shah 
and his policies for many years, the Islamists had claimed a popular mandate to govern 
Iran, and the Iranian Revolution became the Islamic Revolution.
Much of the analysis of the revolution focuses on its two leading protagonists: Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the Shah. The errors in Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s personal conduct and 
the myriad failures of his policies are well-documented. However, he had virtually every 
advantage a monarch or autocrat could possibly hope for. In addition to enjoying the 
patronage of the United States of America, as evidenced by the 1953 coup against Dr. 
Mohammad Mossadegh which was arranged largely by the CIA, the Shah had vast oil 
revenues to dispose of, a powerful military and state security apparatus to keep him in 
power, and the support of most of the influential constituencies in Iranian society: the 
aristocracy, the merchant class, and the Shi’a clergy. In fact, the Shah was widely held 
to be the most stable regime in the region, as evidenced by former US President Jimmy 
Carter’s infamous toast on New Years Eve 1977:
“Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the 
more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to 
your leadership and to the respect and the love and admiration which your people give 
to you.”1
                                                
1Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2 January 1978.
4Charles Kurzman, meanwhile, titled his book, which attempts to retroactively predict the 
Iranian Revolution, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.
Khomeini is also the subject of considerable focus in many studies of the revolution, and 
again, the reasons are not unclear. Khomeini is widely regarded as the leader of not 
only the Islamist movement, but of the revolutionary movement itself. Not only had he 
been the most vocal, and therefore the most visible critic of the Shah for years; it was 
also his vision of a government made up of Shi’a jurists, articulated in a series of 
lectures he gave in a seminary in Najaf, titled Islamic Government, which were recorder 
and later trasnscribed by one of his students, that functioned as the ideological 
foundation of the Islamic Republic. It was the most comprehensive argument in favor of 
an active role in political affairs by the Shi’a clergy, and entirely unprecedented in that it 
ascribed to the clergy absolute authority.
Khomeini’s open and persistent criticism of the Shah, and the political philosophy he 
outlined in Islamic Government represent at once the acceleration of one important 
trend in modern Iranian history and a departure from the status quo in the relationship 
between the clergy and the monarchy, both of whom had come to an understanding of 
mutual accommodation and support. The most senior and well-respected Shi’a clerics 
of the 20th century - and under both of whom Khomeini spent a considerable amount of 
time studying and/or working - are generally believed to have each come to respective 
agreements with the successive Pahlavi kings, promising non-interference in politics in 
exchange for other concessions and patronage of Islamic institutions.2 However, in 
another way, the theory outlined in Islamic Government represents the apogee of the 
                                                
2Abrahamian, 2003, Khomeinism, p7-8.
5increasing willingness on the part of Iran’s Shi’a clergy to assert themselves in political 
matters, that had previously manifested itself in multiple crises in Iran, but most notably 
in the insistence on the creation of an Islamic Consultative Assembly that would have 
the power to veto laws that it felt contravened Islamic law. 
From the late 19th century onward, the Shi’a clergy in Iran assumed the role of voice of 
the opposition in Iran; if not to the monarchy itself, then to government policy. A review 
of both the language and rhetoric used by the clerics to articulate that opposition, as 
well as the source of the crises which compelled them to speak out, indicates another 
pattern in Iranian politics during this time: nationalism. The rise of nationalism as one of 
the most powerful political forces in Iran, if not the most powerful, can be traced back to 
the growing influence foreign powers were able to exert in Iran under the Qajar dynasty 
and later under the Pahlavi shahs.
This dissertation takes as its point of departure the question: Why did the Islamic 
Revolution occur? Naturally, this question begs several further questions, of which three 
will be addressed here: Why did the Shah fall? What had changed so that Shi’a Islam 
abandoned its traditional position of political quietism? Why did Iranians embrace Islam 
as a political movement?
Rather than address these questions individually, an attempt will be made to identify 
trends in Iranian history that may have led to the politicization of Islam and its position 
as the most visible opposition movement and, therefore, the vanguard of the Revolution. 
Because, although Mohammad Reza Pahlavi erred gravely and frequently throughout 
6his reign as Shah, to some extent the die had been cast long before he came to power, 
and his failings acted as the catalyst for revolution rather than the cause.
Nikkie Keddie has argued that there is a strong inverse correlation between the power 
of the ulama and the strength of the country’s central government. She observes that 
while states such as the Ottoman Empire and Egypt were able to modernize their army 
and institute a central bureaucracy, the Qajars were unable to do so. Thus, the growth 
of ulama power in Iran in the 19th century was the direct result of a “governmental 
‘power vacuum.’”3
The weakness of the Qajar state also manifested itself in another important way: the 
increasing penetration of Iran, politically and economically, by foreign powers, notably 
Russia and Great Britain, as part of their ‘Great Game’ for imperial domination of 
Central Asia. The consistent military defeats suffered by the Qajars at the hands of the 
Russians and the British were not only humiliating, but also had a considerable impact 
beyond the loss of territory, as Abrahamian notes:
“Thus military defeats led to diplomatic concessions; diplomatic concessions produced 
commercial capitulations; commercial capitulations paved the way for economic 
penetration; and economic penetration, by undermining traditional handicrafts was to 
cause drastic social dislocations.”4
Meanwhile, another effect of the growing foreign presence in Iran was the exposure of 
the country to Western ideas and the emergence of a new intellectual class, versed in 
the political terminology of the West. So it was that liberalism, nationalism, socialism, 
and constitutionalism entered not only the Iranian political vocabulary, but the political 
                                                
3Keddie, 1978, “The roots of the ulama’s power in modern Iran,” p34.
4Abrahamian, 1982, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p52.
7arena as well. At this time, Iranians also became aware of the relative weakness of the 
country in the global political order.5 Thus, political activism and opposition were often 
couched in terms of nationalism.
Below, the following three trends in Iran from the 19th century onward will be explored: 
the increasing interference in Iran by foreign powers, first Great Britain and Russia, then 
the United States of America; the growing assertiveness of the Shi’a ulama; the rise of 
nationalism as a political force and mode of discourse, used not only by the clergy, but 
by the monarchy, and various other political groups as well; and, finally, the merging of 
these three trends in the late -19th and 20th centuries, culminating in the Islamic 
Revolution in 1977-79.
Chapter 1 examines the Shi’a conception of authority by tracing the philosophical 
origins of the branch, its historical experiences, and how these have evolved. Beginning 
with the schism between the Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam, we will explore the 
nature of legitimate authority in Shi’a belief. Then, we will assess how this conception 
might have been affected by the persistent harassment which the Shi’a have had to 
endure for the better part of Islamic history. Next, the various responses to the Greater 
Occultation of the 12th Imam will be explored, as well as the conditions under which 
these responses were developed, concluding with the embrace of the Safavid dynasty 
in Iran and the transition to a new conception of authority that not only closely mirrored 
that of Sunni Islam, but also helped to facilitate the negative evaluation of the state by 
the ulama in later centuries.
                                                
5ibid. p50-51.
8Chapter 2 explores the history of Shi’a political activism in Iran, beginning with the 
Tobacco Protest of the early 1890s, followed by the Constitutional Revolution of the 
early 20th century. This is followed by a review of the oil nationalization crisis and the 
role of Ayatollah Kashani, and the clerical response to the Shah’s ‘White Revolution,’ 
instituted in 1963. The natural diversity of Shi’a political thought is touched on briefly, as 
are some of the characteristics of the Shi’a hierarchy and how these have affected the 
levels of clerical political activism, as well as the political thought of Mullah Ahmad 
Naraqi, who elaborated the theory of vilayat-i faqih. The purpose of the 2nd chapter is to 
chart the development of the ulama as perhaps the only consistent voice of opposition 
in Iranian politics.
Chapter 3 reviews Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Government. In it, the structure of 
Khomeini’s vilayat-i faqih, or lack thereof is explored. Khomeini’s religious reasoning for 
the institutionalization of government by the Shi’a clergy is examined first, followed by 
his arguments that an Islamic society should naturally have an Islamic government. The 
politicization of this theoretical exercise by virtue of reference to contemporary events 
and trends will then be analyzed, as well as the recurring use of nationalist rhetoric. 
Finally, Khomeini’s ideal vision will then be compared to the Islamists’ political platform 
during the revolutionary period and the ways in which Khomeini’s vision of Islamic 
government was adapted to address the popular aspirations of the Iranian public, will be 
assessed.
Chapter 4 addresses the following question: Why Islam? It is hoped that it will have 
been made clear through the previous three chapters why the Shi’a clergy in Iran 
adopted an increasingly assertive stance in politics. However, the question then 
9becomes: Why did the Iranian people embrace Islam, first as a protest movement, and 
then as an alternate form of government to the monarchy? The 4th chapter explores the 
myriad reasons for the general acceptance of the Islamist movement as the leading 
force of the revolution, including, among others, the structure of the Shi’a network of 
mosques, the viability of Islam as an alternate identity in a dichotomous world order, 
and the historical legitimacy of the ulama as critics of the government, among others.
Chapter 6 discusses the relationship between the Shah’s foreign relations, particularly 
with the United States and Great Britain, but also with Israel. The way in which the 
Shah’s alignment with the West was perceived, especially in the context of the Cold 
War, will be considered. The relationship, and the way it was viewed by Iranians, will be 
explored against the trends into which the paper has already inquired, Relations with 
Israel under the Shah will also be looked at, as will the Shah’s program of 
modernization which was widely perceived as Westernization.
Chapter 7 briefly considers how Keddie’s model of an inverse correlation between the 
growth of a strong central government on the one hand and the power of the ulama on 
the other applies to the Islamic Revolution. Concluding that it does not, but instead 
reflects an aberration from this paradigm, an alternative explanation for the willingness 
of the clergy to challenge both the personality of the Shah and the institution of the 
monarchy prior to the revolution will be offered.
This dissertation will then conclude with a summary of the patterns identified in Iranian 
politics: the increasing penetration of all spheres of life in Iran by foreign powers, in 
particular Great Britain and Russia (the Soviet Union), and later, the United States; the 
growth of political consciousness in Iran and the exposure to Western ideas and modes 
10
of political discourse; the increasingly assertive posture of the Shi’a ulama in Iranian 
politics; the emergence of nationalism as the dominant political discourse from the late 
19th century onward; and the declining power of the Iranian central government and the 
reversal of this trend under the Pahlavi dynasty. These trends will then be considered in 
the context of the Iranian Revolution that displaced the Pahlavi dynasty and installed in 
its place an Islamic Republic.
The findings of this review will then be presented, and it is hoped that a clear idea will 
emerge of how the trends listed in the paragraph above spawned and accelerated one 
another or merged altogether to shape the development of Iranian politics in the 20th 
century under the Pahlavi dynasty, culminating in the Islamic Revolution that brought 
Khomeini and the Islamists to power.
11
Chapter 1: The History of Shi’a Islam
How the origins and the experiences of the Shi’a Branch of Islam shape its conceptions of authority, and 
how relations between the ulama and the state
In order to understand the dynamics and evolution of the relationship between the 
Shi'ite clergy and government in modern history, it is useful to explore the basic Shi'ite 
conception of authority and what role this plays in the formation of the Shi'ite identity. It 
is also informative to examine how that conception has changed and adapted, as well 
as under what conditions. In this chapter, the history of Shi'a Islam will be reviewed in 
brief, with particular attention paid to the schism in Islam that distinguishes Shi'a from 
Sunni Islam, the Occultation of the 12th Imam, and the religious policy of the Safavid 
Dynasty in the early 16th century.
J. S. and T. Y. Ismael write:
"The accepted infallibility of the Prophet's authority in all matters gave the community a 
unified outlook on life, religion and politics. His death in 632 A.D., however, forced 
Moslems to begin to look for answers to the immediate tasks suddenly facing them: 
Who is the successor? What kind of a government should they have? What is the 
Islamic method of choosing a successor to the prophet? Who is the best qualified to run 
the affairs of the community at the time?"6
Following the death of Muhammad, competing proposals for the nomination and method 
of selection of his successor were advanced. However, a consensus could not be 
                                                
6Ismael and Ismael, 1980, “Social change in Islamic Society: the political thought of Ayatollah 
Khomeini,” p601.
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reached, and infighting within the Islamic community ensued. As Ismael & Ismael further 
note, what this reflects is that:
"1) The Quran did not provide a guideline on the question of succession or form of the 
Islamic state. 2) The Prophet neither chose a successor nor established a preference 
for one form of state over another, as long as the Moslems abided by the teachings of 
Islam. 3) Three patterns of succession emerged: a) limited choice (Abu Bakr); b) 
nomination by the caliph (Umar); c) Shoura or consultation (Uthman and Ali). 4) The 
question of succession led to the greatest conflict, which turned into a religious schism 
in Islam."7
The conflict and schism to which they refer is that which originally distinguished the 
Shi'a from the Sunnis. Differences between the two groups emerged over two, closely 
related questions regarding the succession to the Prophet's station: 1) What were the 
responsibilities the leader had to his community? 2) Who was the most qualified to fulfill 
those responsibilities?
The Sunnis (from ahl al-sunnah wa'l'jama-ah, people of tradition and consensus) held 
that Muhammad's role as an interlocutor between God and his believers was unique. 
They also believed that the Islamic scripture which the Prophet had revealed was 
perfect, that its deeper meanings had only to be understood, and that ordinary Muslims 
were capable of doing so. Therefore, it was their belief that the faith's new leader would 
be succeeding only to the Prophet's temporal station. The role of that leader was to 
maintain order within the community and to protect and advance the interests of Islam.
                                                
7ibid, p602.
13
The Shi'a (Shi'a Ali, faction of Ali) however, believed that there were deeper truths 
within Islam which could not be understood without the help of someone with knowledge 
of the divine. Therefore, it was necessary that someone occupy this spiritual station of 
the Prophet. As their full name suggests, the Shi'a held that Ali, Muhammad's cousin 
and son-in-law, was such an individual, and that the Prophet had, in fact, designated Ali 
as his chosen successor. In advancing these claims, the Shi'a refer to multiple traditions 
according to which Muhammad repeatedly extols Ali's virtues, and even appears to 
suggest explicitly that Ali is also a vehicle of divine knowledge and that Ali should 
succeed him. For example, al-Tirmidhi, one of the principal collectors of hadiths 
attributes the following to Muhammad: "The truth circulates with him wherever he goes"8
and "I am from Ali and Ali is from me."9 He also recounts that:
"On once occasion, the Prophet called 'Ali and began whispering to him. After a time 
those present began saying: 'He has been a long time whispering to his cousin.' Later, 
the Prophet said: 'It was not I that was whispering to him but God."10
The Shi'a used these and other traditions and hadiths as proof that the Prophet, whom 
all Muslims agree was infallible, wished for Ali to succeed him and knew that Ali, too, 
was blessed with divine insight. Another tradition quotes Muhammad as having said: 
"[Ali] is the guardian of every believer after me."11
                                                
8Tirmidhi, 1875, Sunan Volume II, p298, quoted in Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 
p14.
9Tirmidhi, 1875, Sunan Volume II, p299, quoted in Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 
p14.
10Tirmidhi, 1875, Sunan Volume II, p300, quoted in Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 
p15.
11Tirmidhi, 1875, Sunan Volume II, p298, quoted in Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 
p17.
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The Shi'a also believed Ali, like Muhammad, was infallible, and that the same was true 
of his daughter, Fatima, who was also Ali's wife and the mother of his children. Shi'ites 
believe that the descendants of the union between Fatima and Ali would also be 
infallible, and endowed with the same qualities that had given Muhammad and Ali 
legitimate authority within the community: knowledge of the deepest layer of truths 
within Islam. The Shi'a claim that the Prophet suggested this himself, quoting, among 
other traditions, another recorded by al-Tirmidhi:
"The Prophet took the hand of Hasan and Husayn [Ali's sons] and said: 'Whoever loves 
me and loves these two and loves their mother and father, will be with me in my stations 
on the Day of Resurrection."12
The belief in the Imamate and the exclusive conception of authority that, in effect, 
mutually reinforce one another, are central to Shi'ite identity. However, the line of 
Fatima and Ali ended with the disappearance of the 12th Imam. The Shi'a maintain that 
the 12th Imam has not disappeared, but has instead gone into a state of occultation, 
and will return at some stage to establish a new order of justice on Earth. What is 
certain, however, is that the absence of the Imam created a crisis of leadership for the 
Shi'a and necessitated the formulation of a new conception of authority. The end of the 
line of Imams, therefore, is another watershed moment in the history of Shi'a Islam and 
the development of political thought within the sect. As noted above, the Shi'a position 
had previously been to reject any authority or government except for that of the Prophet 
and of the Imams. This position had been further strengthened by:
                                                
12Tirmidhi, 1875, Sunan Volume II, p301, quoted in Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 
p15.
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“the persistent harassment and oppression which the Shi'iah had to endure throughout 
a significant period of Islamic history. In the face of this harassment and the expectation 
of the Imam's return, Shi'iah theory developed the doctrine of taqiyah, a dissimulation of 
religious and political beliefs."13
Faced with the prospect of a prolonged absence of the Imams, the Shi'a clerics were 
forced to find a solution to the question of legitimate authority. Ervand Abrahamian, the 
historian, notes three basic types of response:
"Some argued that because all rulers were in essence usurpers, true believers should 
shun the authorities like the plague. They should decline government positions; avoid 
Friday prayers, where thanks were invariably offered to the monarch; take disputes to 
their own legal experts rather than to the state judges; practice taqiyya (dissimulation) 
when in danger; and pay khoms (religious taxes), not to the government but to their 
clerical leaders, in their capacity as Nayeb-e Imam (Imam's deputies).
Others, however, argued that one should grudgingly accept the state. They claimed that 
bad government was better than no government; that many imams had categorically 
opposed armed insurrections; and that Imam Ali, in his often quoted Nahj al-Balaghah
(Way of eloquence), had warned of the dangers of social chaos. They also pointed out 
that Jafar Sadeq, the sixth and most scholarly of the imams, had stressed: 'If your ruler 
is bad, ask God to reform him; but if he is good, ask God to prolong his life.'"14
The third response outlined by Abrahamian is the enthusiastic embrace of the state, 
which, he notes, found increasing currency during the Safavid era in Iran. This 
                                                
13Ismael and Ismael, 1980, “Social change in Islamic society: the political thought of Ayatollah 
Khomeini,” p 606.
14Abrahamian, 1993, Khomeinism, p18-19.
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rationalization of the acceptance of the state is also based on the premium placed on 
order and the abhorrence of anarchy and chaos. The clerics who adopted this approach 
often quoted the commandment from the Koran to "obey those among you who have 
authority."15 Ironically, Khomeini cites this same verse when making his case for a 
government of Islamic jurists.16 As Abrahamian points out: "In this form the Shii concept 
of the state was the mirror image of that of the conservative Sunnis."17 As noted 
previously, the Sunni conception of authority held that the duties of the leader of the 
Islamic community were to create order and to protect the interests of the faith.
The Safavids were a Sufi religious order from the Azerbaijan region of Iran. Early in the 
16th century, the Safavids began to expand their territory. Despite their Sufi origins, the 
Safavids claimed to be descendants of the Imams and forcibly converted the people in 
their newly conquered territories to Shi'a Islam. Most historians agree that this was most 
likely done in order to forge a new national identity18 - Iran had been fragmented for 
centuries, consisting of small, localized dynasties. Furthermore, the territories 
comprising Iran were surrounded by Sunni states. By forcing the population in these 
small states to convert to Shi'a Islam, the Safavids may have been directing their focus 
outwards and establishing a unifying identity in their new empire. The Safavids even 
went so far as to invite Shi'ite scholars from all over the region, notably Iraq, Syria, and 
Bahrain. These clerics, it was hoped, would not only propagate Shi'a Islam throughout 
the new empire, but would also lend the new state an air of legitimacy. The founding of 
the Safavid Empire represents a third watershed moment in Shi'a history. It is at this 
                                                
15Koran, 4:59.
16Khomeini, 1981, Islamic Government, p57, (translated by Hamid Algar).
17Abrahamian, 1993, Khomeinism, p19.
18Stathis, 1999, “The Safavids and the beginning of the modern Iranian nation and state,” p1.
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stage that the modern, pre-Khomeini model of mutual support between the state and 
the clergy first emerged. While the Safavids continued to spread Shi'a Islam and to 
encourage its growth, the clerics consented not to expose their spurious claims to be 
descended from the Prophet or the other religious inconsistencies which the Safavids 
had constructed. In effect, the clergy had become one of the pillars of the state, a 
relationship which persisted, to various degrees, through the Pahlavi regime.
The symbiotic relationship which developed between the Safavid state and the Shi'ite 
clergy demonstrates a remarkable adaptability on the part of Shi'a political thought. With 
perhaps the exception of the Fatimid caliphate (which was, in fact, an Ismaili Shi'a 
dynasty, and interestingly sought to legitimize its authority in much the same way that 
the Safavids did), Shi'a Islam had not been in such a strong position before. While the 
traditional stance of the Shi'a on the nature of legitimate authority appears to be quite 
inflexible, it has, in fact, evolved over time. As Ismael and Ismael note, however, the 
oppression of the Shi'a throughout the region and over a substantial period of time 
"stimulated the search for a theory of the nature of political authority during the period of 
the Greater Occultation of the last Imam [...]."19 The rise of the Safavids began roughly 
600 years after the disappearance of the 12th Imam. It seems only natural, therefore, 
that with the passage of time, the willingness of the clergy to consider alternatives to the 
Imamate during the Occultation would gradually rise. Furthermore, during the period of 
Safavid ascendancy, the neighboring Sunni states were largely facing considerable 
levels of adversity, leaving the door open to suggestions that the new dynasty enjoyed 
some measure of divine favor. The conversion to one true faith (in this case Shi'ism) 
                                                
19Ismael and Ismael, 1980, “Social change in Islamic society: the political thought of Ayatollah 
Khomeini,” p 606.
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and the resounding successes that followed might even have invited comparisons with 
the Prophet Muhammad. What is certain, however, is that the continued occultation of 
the 12th Imam, the long history of persecution of Shi'a Muslims, and the emergence of a 
rising Shi'a state appear to have prompted a serious review of Shi'ite political thought.
One of the principal features of Shi'a Islam is the diversity of thought in all spheres of 
life: social, political, economic, etc. This is most likely the result of the belief in a deeper 
meaning within religious texts and traditions, which emphasizes the need for 
interpretation, a duty ideally accorded to the Imams. However, with the Imams gone for 
so long, and their absence in general unprecedented, this duty fell to the Islamic 
scholars.
This practice is known as ijtihad. "Ijtihad is defined [...] in the jurisprudential sense [as] 
'the capacity for making deductions in matters of law in cases to which no express text 
or rule already determined by Ijma (consensus) is applicable).' However, it has also 
been described as a 'rethinking' or, most commonly, as 'independent reasoning.'"20
Of particular interest are the notions of a lack of consensus and "'rethinking.'" The lack 
of consensus in the face of the absence of the only authority which was universally 
recognized by the Shi'a clerics is indicative of the reluctance to accept any other model 
of government. However, it also implies a continuing possibility of new interpretations. 
The same is true of "'rethinking,'" although this further suggests a rejection of the 
previous popular thinking.
The rise of the Safavid Empire and its subsequent embrace by the Shi'ite clerical 
establishment in Iran are evidence of the intellectual and philosophical flexibility of Shi'a 
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political thought. The embrace of the Safavid dynasty reflects not only the ambiguity 
within Shi'a traditions of the nature of legitimate authority whilst the 12th Imam remains 
in a state of occultation, but also the ability - or perhaps even inclination - to respond to 
contemporary social and political conditions. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than 
in the different interpretations of the famous, aforementioned Koranic verse: "Obey 
those in authority among you." Cited as an exhortation to accept existing political 
authority by the clerics who sought to legitimize the rule of the Safavids, Ayatollah 
Khomeini referenced this same verse as an appeal to obey the sacred law and the 
wishes of the Prophet and the Imams, which, he argued, implied that the Shi'ite clergy
should assume the responsibilities of the Imams, both political as well as spiritual.
The decline of the Safavid dynasty, however, and the increasing penetration of Iran by 
foreign powers, permanently altered the dynamic between the state and the ulama.
20
Chapter 2: A Brief History of Clerical Political Activism in Modern Iranian History
A review of the clergy's role during the Tobacco Protest, the Constitutional Revolution, the Oil 
Nationalization Crisis, the White Revolution, and the Status of Forces Agreement
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's call for a government of Islamic jurists represented a 
grand departure from the traditional Shi'ite position on monarchy. While the clergy had 
on occasion engaged in open confrontation with the Shahs of Iran, particularly during 
the late Qajar years and throughout the Pahlavi era, the institution of monarchy itself 
had never been questioned or threatened. A quick review of the greatest political crises 
in Iran over the last 120 years illustrates an increasing willingness on the part of the 
clergy to criticize and confront the nation's rulers. Despite the impressive range of 
positions on many issues, a result of the jurist's tradition of ijtihad - “the process of 
arriving at judgments on points of religious law using reason and the principles of 
jurisprudence”21 - no Shi’ite scholar had ever so openly challenged the institution of 
monarchy or called for the clergy to exercise the functions of government. Below, the 
various clerical responses to the greatest political crises in modern Iranian history will 
be examined. It is hoped that it will be conclusively shown that the Shi'ite clergy had 
displayed an increasing disposition to assert their will and to confront the monarchy, 
culminating in Khomeini's Islamic Goverment. Furthermore, it will also be shown that 
segments of the clergy have frequently attached themselves to nationalist movements 
in Iran. Other factors that may have contributed to the willingness of the clergy to assert 
itself will also be explored.
                                                
21Momen, 1985, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, p186.
21
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, generally acknowledged as the first cleric to have called 
for an end to monarchy and its replacement by a government of Islamic jurists, spent 
many years working and studying under Ayatollah Mohammad Hosayn Borujerdi. 
Borujerdi is regarded as the model of the apolitical cleric. Widely recognized as the 
senior 'source of emulation' - marja-e taqlid - among the Shi'ite clergy from the late 
1940s until his death in 196122, Borujerdi fastidiously avoided politics and is believed to 
have used his senior position and considerable influence among the clergy to persuade 
them to do so as well. In fact, known to have been close to Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, Borujerdi is known to have come to an arrangement with the young king:
"[They] were both worried about the virtual occupation of parts of Iran and they both 
disliked the Communists. Borujerdi wanted women to have the choice of wearing the 
veil in public if and when they wished to do so (this choice had been totally forbidden 
under Reza Shah), and he wanted mullahs and Islam itself treated with more public 
respect. The shah wanted the tacit support of a paramount Shiah leader who would also 
remain apolitical in the tradition of Ha'eri. Perhaps each of them understood the other's 
need without hearing it expressed; [...] By and large, each one lived up to what the other 
expected of him."23
Ayatollah Shaykh Abdul-Karim Ha'eri is another senior cleric who was "famous not only 
for his learning but also for his scrupulous avoidance of politics - even during the 
turbulent 1910s."24 Khomeini had also studied under Ha'eri, and even followed him to 
Qom from Arak in 1921 when the latter was invited to restore the seminary there and 
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establish a center of Islamic scholarship in Iran to rival that of Najaf, in Iraq. Qom 
quickly eclipsed Mashad as Iran's leading center of Shi'ite learning, due to three factors:
"[In] part because of Ha'eri, in part because clerical refugees from Iraq settled there, 
and in part because Reza Shah patronized the center to reward the clerics there for 
staying out of politics. Qom remained conspicuously quiet for much of Reza Shah's 
reign - in contrast to other religious centers, such as Mashad, which periodically burst 
into open opposition against Reza Shah's secular reforms. Yahya Dawlatabadi, the 
historian and politician, wrote that Reza Shah supported Ha'eri to counter the growth of 
republicanism, communism, and other forms of radicalism."25
Both Ayatollah Borujerdi and Ayatollah Ha'eri, meanwhile, spent considerable time 
under the tutelage of Ayatollah Mohammed Kazim Khorasani. Khorasani, who was 
unsurpassed, if not without equal, as a jurisconsult of his time, lent his support to the 
constitutional movement in Iran in the early years of the 20th century. One of his 
contemporaries, Sheikh Fazlollah Noori, meanwhile sought to limit the constitutional 
movement.
Both Khorasani and Noori, in turn, studied under Ayatollah Mirza Mohammed Hassan 
Hosseini Shirazi, who is known for his fatwa prohibiting the purchase or use of tobacco 
by Muslims after a British company was granted a concession controlling all aspects of 
the production and sale of Iranian tobacco. Shirazi, meanwhile, studied under Sheikh 
Mortaza Ansari, the founder of the marja-e taqlid model and the senior Islamic jurist of 
his time. Roy Mottahedeh writes of Ansari:
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"[He] was probably the first "model" who, according to the principles of the newly 
reconstructed jurisconsult school, received the recognition of the great majority of other 
mullahs of that school; but he seems never to have exerted this authority actively 
among the Shiah community."26
It is apparent, then, that there is no established position on the role clerics may or 
should play in politics. While, according to Mottahedeh, consultation of religious 
scholars is a tradition of almost every school of Islamic thought27 - and one which 
Fazlollah Noori had sought to codify, in lieu of a legislative parliament - there is no 
consensus on whether the clergy should openly defy the monarchy if they feel that he is 
abrogating the laws of Islam. This comes as little wonder considering that the Shi'a 
community's central belief is that the only the Prophet's line can legitimately exercise 
authority. Following the disappearance of the 12th Imam, the clergy generally adopted 
one of three approaches, according to Ervand Abrahamian: to operate outside the 
established government, effectively making the clerics the administrators of the 
community as recipients of taxes and judges in disputes; to "grudgingly accept the 
state" because order, even if imposed by a despot, was significantly preferable to 
anarchy; or, to embrace the state based on the Koran's commandment to "obey [...] 
those in authority among you." The latter response to the 12th Imam's absence became 
particularly popular during the Safavid era, when Shi'a Islam was established as the 
official religion of the nation. It seems that by the 19th century, during the Qajar era, 
most clerics had come to adopt one of the latter two approaches. It is not unlikely that 
this is due in large part to the rise of the Safavids and their patronage of Shi'ism. 
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Effectively, clerical receptiveness to monarchy rose during the Safavid period because 
Shah Ismail I forcibly converted the population to Shi'a Islam and executed or exiled 
those who refused. While Shi'a enclaves had existed in Iran for centuries, not since the 
Fatimid caliphate of the 10th-12th centuries had Shi'ites had a proper state of their own. 
The Safavids, therefore, were good for Islam (at least the Shi'ite brand)28. Furthermore, 
the Safavids claimed to be descended from the 7th Imam and to be acting as the 
representatives of the Hidden Imam during the Greater Occultation. Shi'a clerics were 
invited from all over the region, particularly Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain, and many 
enthusiastically accepted. As Moojan Momen explains:
"Thus in the early period of the Safavid dynasty there appears to have been an uneasy 
alliance between the state and the ulama [Muslim legal scholars] with the state 
supporting the ulama by enforcing Shi'ism on the populace while the ulama supported 
the state and kept quiet about the inconsistencies in the religious stance of the 
monarch."29
The inconsistencies to which Momen refers are the Safavids' spurious claims to be 
descened from the Imams, the notion that this would entitle them to rule (they would 
also have to have been designated by the Imams as their representatives in the event 
of a prolonged absence), as well as the Sufism which they practiced before beginning 
their campaign to conquer Iran.30
It appears that it was at this point in time that the monarchy and the vast majority of the 
Shi'ite clergy came to an understanding, and the right of kings to rule was accepted. As 
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long as the fortunes of the Shi'ite community were on the ascendancy, the monarchy 
was considered legitimate. It is interesting to note the attempt here to fabricate of some 
form of nationalism. Following the decline of the Timurid empire, Iran fragmented into 
many smaller, local states. It is likely that Shah Ismail I anticipated that these entities 
would be absorbed by one of the neighboring states, notably the Ottoman Empire, 
which was ruled by Sunnis. Unifying the different peoples of Iran by exploiting a 
common religion would not be sufficient; that religion would have to distinguish Iran from 
its neighbors and unify it against them.
The Safavid dynasty eventually fell and was replaced, by way of the Afsharid and Zand 
dynasties, by the Qajar dynasty. The fall of the Safavids had seen Iran fragmented once 
more. Although Iran was reconstituted under the Qajars, some of the peripheral 
territories held at the height of Safavid power were lost. Despite the decline of the Shi'a 
state, however, the Shi'a clergy did not question the Iranian monarchy, with one notable 
exception: Mullah Ahmad Naraqi.
Naraqi is acknowledged as one of the leading ulama of his time (early 19th century), 
and he is known primarily for his articulation of the theory of the vilayat-i faqih - the 
guardianship of the jurist, which gives the Islamic Republic of Iran its legitimacy. Hamid 
Dabashi writes that Naraqi seeks to justify the right of the clerics to administer the 
people in much the same way that Khomeini does: by referencing the Shi'a traditions, 
where, he argues, the Imams stipulated that the clerics should exercise their functions, 
as well as by appealing to reason.
26
"This approach can be found in Ahmad Naraqi's work where he quotes nineteen 
separate tradition-reports to support the doctrine and then adds that it is in any case 
self-evidently logical and rational."31
Naraqi's chief contribution appears to be his contention that legal speculation, or al-
mazzanah, on the part of the Shi'ite jurists is both necessary and legitimate. The 
doctrinal basis, or rationale, for the clergy's reluctance to seek greater political power, 
was that the clerics, unlike the Imams, are not infallible; therefore, they are as prone to 
error as anyone else, and that this would sully the spiritual station they hold in the 
absence of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam.
"The significance of Naraqi's notion of 'al-mazannah' lies in its providing the faqih with a 
doctrinal basis to speculate rather more freely in judicial issues, with its political 
repercussions."32
In effect, the Shi'a jurisconsults, who are the most qualified to interpret the divine will of 
the Imams, through their extensive knowledge of the Islamic scripture and traditions, are 
afforded room for error by Naraq. Moojan Momen claims that Khomeini cited Naraqi, as 
well as Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Na'ini as predecessors whose views were not so 
different from his own.33 However, neither is held to have gone as far as Khomeini.
"It is significant that in all these discussions, which lasted on and off for some eleven 
centuries, no Shii writer ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were 
illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state."34
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Khomeini's theory of the vilayat-i faqih, then, signifies a radical departure from the status 
quo, if not from the original Shi'a position. Not only had the Shi'ite clergy and the 
monarchy led a relatively amicable coexistence for many years, but the Shah had 
concluded an agreement with Khomeini's mentor, Ayatollah Borujerdi. In this regard, 
Khomeini's steadfast rejection of the institution of monarchy represents an 
unprecedented theory of legitimate government and program for its implementation. Not 
even Naraq sought to displace the monarchy; he only argued that the clerics should 
hold authority over the kings. Furthermore, Khomeini refers explicitly to both the social 
and political conditions in Iran, and implicitly to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi himself. 
In this sense, Islamic Government is not simply a theoretical exercise. Instead, it seems 
to be as much a reaction to the failure of the Shah to fulfill his duty to protect the nation 
as an interpretation of Shi'ite tradition.
This is not to say that the clergy were silent throughout the Safavid, Qajar, and Pahlavi 
periods, up until the revolution that brought the Islamic Republic. Below, the clerical 
responses to the major political crises of the last 120 years will be examined.
In 1890, Naser ed-Din Shah granted the Imperial Tobacco Company of Great Britain a 
concession on the production, distribution, and sale of all tobacco grown in Iran, in order 
to put his finances in order once more. The public outrage was virtually universal. It was 
not limited to the merchants and farmers, whose livelihoods might be affected; it 
extended to the general populace, who were angered that control over a crop so vital 
not only to Iran's economy, but to the Iranian lifestyle as well, would be so callously 
handed over to a foreign power.
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"The natural voice of a protest so nearly universal was the voice of the mullahs. They 
spoke in some part out of their own interests: they controlled considerable agricultural 
land tied up in religious endowments. They spoke also in large part out of shared 
interests: they had close links to the men of the bazaar, who imposed taxes on 
themselves to support the mullahs and religious life in general and who were used to 
turning to mullah courts for settlement of certain kinds of disputes."35
In December of 1891, Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa, or religious decree, that 
declared that, henceforth, by smoking tobacco, Iranians would effectively be declaring 
war against the Hidden Imam. By all accounts, the fatwa had its intended effect. 
Shirazi's decree was disseminated throughout the Shi'ite networks by telegraph and 
leaflet.36 The loss of the Iranian market led the British government to withdraw its 
support for the concession, and Naser ed-Din Shah duly canceled it. Later that month, 
Shirazi issued another fatwa ending the prohibition on the use of tobacco. This 
represents perhaps the greatest incident of clerical defiance of the monarchy before 
Khomeini, as the agenda was direct repeal of the Shah's policy, rather than popular 
representation or the rescission of a concession issues before the Shah's time. This 
was a direct and immediate response to the Shah's decision to grant the tobacco 
concession. In this case, however, the clergy's (in this case Shirazi's) reaction appears 
to have been determined, at least in part, by the public's reaction. As will be shown 
below, the clergy actively guided public opinion during Iran's next political crisis. 
Nevertheless, Shirazi was undoubtedly able to accomplish two things: he directed the 
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population's anger, allowing it to manifest itself constructively, and he established that, 
despite their limited role in government, the clergy were a force to be reckoned with.
During the Persian Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century, the Shi'ite clergy 
again played a central role:
"By 1906 the collective resentment against the Qajars had reached such a point that it 
was as natural for the mullahs to join the movement of protest that became the 
Constitutional Revolution as it was for them to support the resistance to the tobacco 
concession. In fact, without their support the movement would have failed."37
That resentment was due in large part to the growing number of concessions which the 
Qajars continued to issue, even after the Tobacco Protest, and continued encroachment 
on Iran by both Russia and Great Britain. Mottahedeh contends that, according to the 
clergy, the primary government was to guarantee the independence of Muslims and to 
ensure that they not be subjugated to non-Muslims.38 The considerable influence 
exerted by the British and the Russians on Iranian soil, and particularly at the Qajar 
court, was unacceptable. Ervand Abrahamian contends that some of the origins of the 
Constitutional Revolution are to be found in the West in two essential respects: first, as 
illustrated above, it was in many ways a response to Western incursions into Iran; 
second, the manifestation of that response was influenced heavily by the exposure to 
Western ideologies and constitutional successes.39 It should be noted that the effect of 
the foreign domination of Iran was not merely the injury of Iranian national pride; it also 
resulted in the economic dislocation of the urban bazaars that produced a "cross-
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regional middle class that was conscious for the first time of its own common
grievances."40
Ayatollah Mohammed Kazim Khorasani was the leading supporter of the constitutional 
movement within the clerical establishment.
"At first it seemed an even greater coup than the ban on the use of tobacco; the most 
learned 'model' had not just confirmed the sentiments of his imitators, he had actually 
led them."41
The success of the movement resulted in the establishment of an Islamic Consultative 
Assembly, later renamed the National Consultative Assembly. Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, 
like Khorasani a former student of Mirza Shirazi, however, sought to restrict the 
functions of the consultative assembly and called instead for a panel of at least five 
Islamic jurists who would confirm or reject laws based on their compatibility with Islam, 
but would not act as a parliament. Furthermore, these men were to be nominated by the 
jurists themselves, not elected by the people.42 In this, he was supported by Sayyed 
Mohammed Kazem Yazdi.
While Khorasani had supported Noori's initiative to include clause outlawing heresy. 
Nevertheless, he steadfastly supported the constitutional movement until his death in 
1911. That two clerics who had both studied under the same mentor would develop 
such different positions on the role that both they and monarchy should play in the 
community's administration is evidence of both the independence the Shi'ite learned 
men enjoyed to develop their own interpretations of divine will based on the Islamic 
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texts, and of the new willingness of some clerics to challenge their kings and seek 
greater authority for themselves.
While the 1910s were quite a volatile time in their own right, the next major political 
crisis came with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951. 
First, however, some of the developments since to Constitutional Revolution will be 
discussed. Ali Ansari notes an increase in political awareness on the part of the general 
population, which he attributes in part to Reza Shah's whose "industrial and educational 
reforms [...] provided the framework and catalyst for [that] growth."43 This period is 
characterized by the proliferation of political parties, including the emergence of a 
communist party, the Tudeh. Despite the still very limited literacy in the country, new 
newspapers were always being founded, often as the mouthpiece of the new political 
groupings. The Tudeh party was also active in engaging the rural peasantry, who were 
mostly illiterate, and making them aware of their apparent exploitation. This was also 
accomplished by the use of radio broadcasts, which were able to reach those who could 
not read and did not have access to someone who could.44 Ansari asserts that this is the 
point at which Iranian nationalism began to emerge as a popular movement. The 
Pahlavi policies of modernization were perceived instead as Westernization and the 
abandonment of traditional Iranian values.
"Ordinary Iranians began to identify themselves more clearly with a distinctive Iranian 
national culture, while elites who were already imbued with a strong sense of nationalist 
mission were only further convinced of the need for protective measures."45
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Mohammed Mossadegh was able to capture this nationalist sentiment and actively 
shape it into a powerful political force. There is no doubt that Mossadegh was able to 
capture the imagination of the Iranian public and remains an interesting figure in the 
Iranian political consciousness, particularly for the secular opponents of the Islamic 
Republic. Another figure central to the oil nationalization crisis was Ayatollah Abol-
Ghasem Kashani. An early supporter of oil nationalization, Kashani previously had 
urged "all sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the enemies of Islam 
and Iran by joining the nationalization struggle."46 The fusing of religious and nationalist 
rhetoric here is of particular interest. The Prime Minister, Haj Ali Razmara, who had 
sought to find a compromise with the AIOC over a renegotiated distribution of company 
revenues, was duly assassinated by a member of the Fedayin-e Islam. His murder was 
roundly celebrated, evidence of a "tremendous upsurge in nationalist feeling throughout 
the country - a feeling which, as the assassination now indicated, had now been firmly 
wedded to religion."47 Of Mossadegh's National Front, Ansari states:
"[It] was a broad movement composed of different parties including socialists and 
secular and religious nationalists, and driven less by a cohesive rigorous ideological 
platform and more by ambiguous if potent ideas of self-determination, nationhood and 
anti-imperialism."48
The power of nationalism as the greatest common denominator of the population, as 
well as the path of least resistance to its mobilization, was becoming ever more clear. In 
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some ways, the diverse composition of the National Front was reflected once more in 
the broad movement that led to the Iranian Revolution of 1977-79.
However, Kashani withdrew his support when it became clear that Mossadegh's
popularity and perception as leader of the nationalization movement would always be 
greater than his own. Also, Mossadegh began to accrue to himself ever greater political 
powers in order to push through the nationalization, which alienated many of his early 
supporters. Kashani's withdrawal of support is held by some to have facilitated the 1953 
coup that removed Mossadegh from office and reinstated the Shah's powers. Kashani 
claimed that Mossadegh had defied the Shah, been a traitor to his country, and 
abrogated the sacred Islamic law.49 His mission had lost its sanctification. It is interesting 
here that for the most part, the clergy remained silent on the subject of oil 
nationalization. In all likelihood, this is due in large part to the influence of Ayatollah 
Borujerdi, who, as mentioned above, was recognized at the time as the senior marja-e 
taqlid and actively encouraged the clerics to stay out of politics. Not even Khomeini 
spoke out against or in favor of nationalization.
The next major political crisis to hit Iran was the Shah's aggressive series of reforms 
known as the Enghelab-e Sefid, or White Revolution.
The White Revolution was a wide-ranging program of reforms, centered around land 
reform. Many in the clergy objected to these reforms on the basis that, in addition to 
appropriating and redistributing private property, women were given the right to vote. By 
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this time, Borujerdi had passed away, as, therefore, had his "ban on [the clergy's] 
political involvement."50
None, however, went so far as Ayatollah Khomeini. In a speech in April 1963, he also 
took issue with a stipulation of the reforms that to be male and Muslim were no longer 
requirements to hold local office:
"The Ministry of Justice has made clear its opposition to the ordinances of Islam by 
various measures like the abolition of the requirement that judges be Muslim and male; 
henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the Muslims are to decide 
on the affairs concerning the honor and person of the Muslims. The strategy of this 
government and certain of its members is to bring about the total effacement of the 
ordinances of Islam. As long as this usurpatory [sic] and rebellious government is in 
power, the Muslims can have no hope for any good."51
As early as 1963, then, he had attacked the Shah's government itself, not just its 
individual policies. Furthermore, he had articulated this in a context of Islamic 
nationalism. Here, however, he does not mention the Shah by name. That is not the 
case in another speech held on the occasion of 'Ashura of the same year. However, 
here Khomeini addresses the Shah directly and encourages him to change his ways 
and redeem himself. He goes on to address himself to the:
"Iranian nation! Those among you who are thirty or forty years of age or more will 
remember how three foreign countries attacked us during World War II. The Soviet 
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Union, Britain, and America invaded Iran and occupied our country. The property of the 
people was exposed to danger and their honor was imperilled [sic]. But God knows,
everyone was happy because the Pahlavi had gone!"52
Khomeini also ascribes much blame for a police attack in March on the Fayzieh 
seminary in Qom, and asks whether the Shah himself might be Jewish. He also draws 
comparisons between that attack and its victims and the war waged by the Ummayad 
Caliph Yazid I on Husain. On the occasion of 'Ashura, which remembers Imam Husain's 
martyrdom at the hands of Yazid at Karbala, this comparison was especially potent. The 
themes of foreign intervention and exploitation recur here. Two days later, the Shah had 
Khomeini arrested. As news of this spread, protests erupted throughout the country and 
were violently suppressed.
When, in 1964, the Shah granted US military personnel immunity from prosecution in 
Iranian courts, Khomeini was quick to attack the Shah and illustrate once more the fact 
that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was subservient to his foreign "masters." In a speech 
given on 27 October, 1964, Khomeini attacked the new law:
"If some American's servant, some American's cook, assassinates your marja in the 
middle of the bazaar, or runs over him, the Iranian police do not have the right to 
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apprehend him! Iranian courts do not have the right to judge him! The dossier must be 
sent to America, so that our masters there can decide what is to be done!"53
Furthermore, Khomeini went on to assert that government was seeking to reduce the 
power and influence of the religious leaders, because, if given the opportunity, they 
would free Iran from servitude to Great Britain and the US, prevent the takeover of the 
Iranian economy by Israel, and end the excessive spending of the Pahlavi regime.#
Khomeini was eventually exiled to Turkey. Perhaps the only reason he was not 
executed by the Shah's secret police was his high profile, as well as his status as a 
marja. From Turkey, Khomeini found his way to the Shi'ite seminaries in Najaf. Here, he 
was able to criticize the Shah freely, and he continued to do so.
Meanwhile, although the Shah continued to be relatively unpopular, Iran remained 
stable. Reza Pahlavi, meanwhile, appears to have recognized his shortcomings as far 
as his nationalist credentials were concerned. Additionally, he also seems to have 
understood that the nationalist sentiment was increasingly being expressed in an 
Islamic context. In a speech to the majles, for example, the Iranian parliament, his 
Prime Minister claimed that "[unless] a man is patriotic there is no room for him in our 
society."54 Meanwhile, as Ansari notes, the Shah also "proceeded to infuse Iranian 
political discourse with crude, often dichotomous, religious imagery - the struggle of 
good versus evil, light versus darkness."55
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n 1973, the Shah appears to have sought to cast himself firmly as the Iranian nationalist 
icon, fearless in the face of the United States and the world powers. Seeking, perhaps, 
to recapture the initiative and to claim the role of nationalist, in December of that year, 
the Shah announced that the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries would be 
quadrupling the price of oil. He is widely held to have been the driving force behind this 
decision.56 While the Shah may have garnered the attention of the international press, 
this seems to have done little for his popularity at home. Ironically, in fact, the infusion of 
this vastly increased oil wealth led to massive inflation. These economic difficulties are 
held to have been a contributing factor in the demonstrations that evolved into the 
movement that resulted in the Islamic Revolution.
Two patterns emerge in this review of the almost constant political turmoil in Iran since 
the late 19th century: the rise of Iranian nationalism, and the increasingly belligerent 
stance of some sections of the Shi'ite clergy. Furthermore, it can also be seen that 
these patterns were invariably married to one another when it was deemed expedient or 
necessary by the actors involved. Of the oil nationalization movement, Ali Ansari writes:
"Where religion served the nationalist cause its political utility and potency were clear."57
One could make a strong case that, in the case of the Islamic Revolution, it was the 
other way around: nationalism served the religious cause. As will be seen below, 
Khomeini's theory and program laid out in Islamic Government make extensive use of 
nationalist rhetoric and devices. Khomeini capitalizes on a considerable paranoia 
prevalent in Iranian politics that circumstances are determined by powerful external 
actors. Abrahamian claims that:
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“[Politics in Iran are] replete with [...] terms [that] treat Iranian politics as a puppet show 
in which foreign powers control the marionettes - the local politicians - by invisible 
strings. The message is that the intelligent observer should ignore appearances and 
focus instead on the hidden links; only then can one follow the plot, understand the 
hidden agendas, and identify the true villains."58
It seems only natural that in this context, the failures and errant policies of the monarchy 
are perceived as plots to weaken the nation and exploit it. These charges carried added 
weight when leveled at the Pahlavi monarchy for several reasons: both the Pahlavi 
shahs had instituted reforms that were intended to modernize the country but were 
instead largely perceived as attempts to imitate Western culture; Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi was brought to power by the Allied Forces during their occupation of Iran in 
World War II; Iran's increasing exposure to the world continued throughout the Pahlavi 
period, in large part because of the emergence of a global economy.
This paranoia has also been observed by, among others, Ann Lambton and Andrew 
Westwood, who writes that: "[in] Iran the distrust of the possession and exercise of 
power is pervasive and intense."59
Abrahamian goes on to state that:
"most observers would agree that political paranoia exists in modern Iran, as long as 
one keeps in mind Hofstadter's important caveat that the term means merely a political 
style and mode of expression, not a clinical and deep-seated psychological disorder. 
What is more, this style can be explained by history, especially Iran's experience of 
imperial domination: foreign powers - first Russia and Britain, later the United States -
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have, in fact, determined the principal formations in the country's political landscape 
over the last two hundred years."60
In many ways, given the pervasive nature of this worldview, the level of political activism 
in Iran during this period is remarkable. It is a wonder that the development of political 
consciousness in Iran was not arrested by a greater sense of fatalism. The role Iran's 
shahs had played in this phenomenon was crucial to the maintenance and growth of 
nationalism in Iran. By creating the character of the domestic co-conspirator to 
accompany that of the manipulative foreign power, the narrative challenged the idea 
that Iran might, in fact, be legitimately weak. Indeed, this might have been a difficult 
notion to accept in a country with such a grandiose history, both actual as well as 
embellished. Instead, it was only in collusion with traitorous rulers and politicians that 
Russia, Britain, and the US were able to successfully manipulate the country. This 
accomplishes two important objectives: first, it allows Iran to save face and masks the 
relative weakness of Iran's position in the world, and second, it imbues the movement 
with a sense of viability. Essentially, the Iranians control the fate of Iran. The notion of 
self-determination is a powerful and important one in the nationalist narratives.
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Chapter 3: The Political Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini
The Velayat-i Faqih, politics, and nationalism
Between January 21, 1970 and February 8 of the same year, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini delivered a series of lectures in Najaf, Iraq. These lectures were recorded and 
transcribed by one of his students, and later published as a book: Islamic Government. 
The subject of the lectures was, as the title suggests, Islamic government. In it, 
Khomeini delivers perhaps the most comprehensive recorded argument in favor of the 
formation of a clerical government. There are four chapters, each examining a different 
aspect of Islamic government. After the first chapter, the introduction, the titles are: The 
Necessity for Islamic government, The Form of Islamic Government, and finally, 
Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government.
Khomeini’s arguments generally fall into one of three categories:
- Qur’anic verses and Shi'a traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and the 
Imams
- appeal to logic, based on the assumption of a Muslim society
- foreign exploitation demands the protection of Islam and Islamic territory by the clerics
Interestingly, Khomeini’s persistent assertion that Iran, and other Muslim lands, are 
being exploited by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union belies the 
rising tide of nationalism in Iran and in Shi’ite political thought. Khomeini returns 
frequently to this subject. In fact, it dominates the introduction. Below, the three strands 
of Khomeini’s argument will be explored individually, based on whether they appeal to 
scripture, logic, or national pride.
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Khomeini begins the introduction to Islamic Government by asserting that anyone 
familiar with Islam must immediately agree with the concept of the vilayat-i faqih:
“The subject of the governance of the faqih (vilayat-i faqih) provides us with the 
opportunity to discuss certain related matters and questions. The governance of the 
faqih is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of 
demonstration, for anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and 
ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance 
of the faqih as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-
evident.”61
What is implied, obviously, is that anyone who does not agree with Khomeini is either 
not sufficiently familiar with the tenets of Islam, or not a true believer. The next several 
pages immediately following the opening paragraph broach the subject of foreign 
interference in Iran, a subject to which we will soon return below. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that Khomeini’s attention turns immediately towards the exploitation of Iran by 
the imperial powers.
We will first examine Khomeini’s arguments which are based on the Qu’ran, the 
Hadiths, and Islamic tradition. The 2nd paragraph of Chapter 2, The Need for Islamic 
Government, begins by pointing out that:
“The most noble messenger […] headed the executive and administrative institutions of 
Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting 
the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the 
implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby 
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bringing into being the Islamic state. He did not content himself with the promulgation of 
law; rather, he implemented it at the same time.”62
This fact sets the tone for argument made in the verses and traditions to follow. He 
continues, in the next chapter:
“The Commander of the Faithful […] relates that the Most Noble Messenger […] said: ‘O 
God! Have mercy on those that succeed me.’ He repeated twice and was then asked: 
‘O Messenger of God, who are those that succeed you?’ He replied: ‘They are those 
that come after me, transmit my traditions and practice, and teach them to the people 
after me.’”63
Because neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet himself gave the Shi’a community specific 
instructions about what to do in the event that the line of Imams should end - or, as 
Twelver Shi‘a believe happened, one should go into occulation - Khomeini appears to 
draw the following conclusion: the Prophet was not only the spiritual leader of his 
community, but its administrator as well, and, because the Prophet appears to 
designate the clerics - “those that transmit [his] traditions and practice” - as his 
successors, the clerics should naturally also be the administrators of their community.
Later in the same chapter, Khomeini refers to Imam Sadiq, the 6th Imam, quoting the 
Prophet, as follows:
“The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of the full 
moon over the stars. Truly the scholars are the heirs of the prophets; the prophets 
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bequeathed not a single dinar or dirham; instead they bequeathed knowledge, and 
whoever acquires it has indeed acquired a generous portion of their legacy.”64
Here, Khomeini outlines his argument himself over the following pages, addressing 
each and every possible objection he foresees. According to him, the “scholars” to 
whom the Prophet must have been referring are the clerics and not the Imams, “for the 
virtues and qualitiesof the Imams that have been mentioned elsewhere are quite 
different from what this tradition contains. Furthermore, a 2nd, slightly different account 
of this declaration by the Prophet, in whose line of transmission Khomeini places less 
faith, goes on to advise: “See from whom you may acquire this knowledge.”65 As far as 
Khomeini is concerned, this suggests that the Prophet holds some of the scholars to be 
untrustworthy. He could not, therefore, have meant the Imams. He further contends that 
the scholars are “the heirs of the prophets” in more than just spiritual station. Instead, he 
postures that because the most common usage of the term Prophet implies the great 
prophets, such as Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, all of whom were leaders of their 
communities in addition to functioning as vehicles of exalted knowledge. Therefore, the 
same must be true of the scholars. Citing the Qur’an now, Khomeini refers to the 
following verse: ‘”The Prophet has higher claims on the believers than their own selves” 
(33:6).66
Khomeini also argues, however, that simple logic dictates that a nation of true believers 
should be led by the fuqaha. The most straightforward argument is this:
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“If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqih, ask him about the 
laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true 
rulers are the fuqaha themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to 
them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of fuqaha on account of their 
own ignorance of the law.”67
The premise is simple: a ruler who must consult the fuqaha before implementing the law 
is not fit to rule, because he is dependent on the clerics for guidance. Only the clerics 
themselves can rule without having to consult anyone else.
Another argument which makes monarchies and other forms of government redundant 
is that Islamic law, the shari’a, provides a framework for all aspects of life, for the 
individual, society, as well as the nation:
“First, the laws of the shari’a embrace a diverse body of laws and regulations, which 
amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have 
been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children 
and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and 
peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations 
pertaining to trade and agriculture.”68
Khomeini also claims, “The Glorious Qur’an and the Sunna contain all the laws and 
ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state.” 
69There appears, then, little need for anyone to draft or propose laws. All the regulation 
needed for a society to function is contained in the Islamic texts, according to Khomeini. 
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All that is needed, then, is someone to interpret the texts. Naturally, the most qualified to 
do so are the Shi’ite clerics. The shari‘a and other Islamic laws and provisions are 
timeless: “According to one of the noble verses of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam 
are not limited with respect to time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted 
until the end of time.”70
Khomeini even appears to cater this argument to a younger, modern audience:
“It is related in the book, Ikmal ad-Din wa Itnam an-Ni’ma that Ishaq ibn Ya’qub wrote a 
letter to the Imam of the Age […] asking him for guidance in certain problems that had 
arisen, and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman al-’Umari, the deputy of the Imam, conveyed the 
letter to him. A response was issued, written in the blessed hand of the Imam, saying: 
‘In case of newly occurring [sic] social circumstances, you should turn for guidance to 
those who relate our traditions, for they are my proof to you, as I am God’s proof.’”71
Perhaps this was intended as a response to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s policy of 
modernization, and a reminder that Islam continues to be relevant.
Khomeini is also careful to specify that it must be a just faqih who rules over the nation.:
“The highest authority must possess the qualities mentioned - comprehensive 
knowledge and justice - but his assistants, officials, and those sent to the provinces 
need know only the laws relevant to their own tasks; on other matters they must consult 
the ruler.”72
Because it would appear that only the clerics fulfill the first criteria set forth by Khomeini, 
the second criteria may be intended to distinguish among the fuqaha themselves. The 
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issue of clerical government was a divisive one. The insinuation that perhaps not all 
clerics are just may have been intended as a rebuke to those clerics who refused to be 
openly critical of the Shah. Perhaps to make this point clear, Khomeini chooses to quote 
the Prophet once more here, albeit by a long way of transmission:
“‘The fuqaha are the trustees of the prophets, as long as they do not concern 
themselves with the illicit desires, pleasures, and wealth of this world.’ The Prophet was 
then asked: ‘O Messenger of God! How may we know if they do so concern 
themselves?’ He replied: ‘By seeing whether they follow the ruling power. If they do that, 
fear for your religion and shun them.’”73
Here, Khomeini is less subtle than before. He implies, quite clearly, that those clerics 
who work with the “ruling power” are collaborators and conspirators. This may have 
been targeted at Ayatollah Abul-Qasem Khoi, a senior apolitical cleric in Najif, Iraq, or 
Ayatollah Shariat’madari, who steadfastly refused to be drawn into opposition against 
the Shah, electing instead to stay out of politics altogether. It is also worth noting that 
Khomeini delivered this lecture from Najaf, where had gone after initially being exiled to 
Turkey, his high profile and rank of Ayatollah likely being the only things that prevented 
his execution by the Shah’s authorities. A reconciliation with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
was out of the question, therefore.
Later, Khomeini refers to Abu Khadija, who quotes Imam Sadiq:
“’When enmity and dispute arise among you, or you disagree concerning the receipt or 
payment of a sum of money, be sure not to refer the matter to one of these malefactors 
for judgment. Designate as judge and arbiter someone among you who is acquainted 
                                                
73ibid, p76.
47
with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited, for I appoint such a 
man as judge over you. Let none of you take your complaint against another of you to 
the tyrannical ruling power.”74
Imam Sadiq would have had to have said this in the later years of the Umayyad 
caliphate or the early years of the Abbasid caliphate. Both were despised by the Shi’ite 
community and seen as usurpers of the line of Imams that descended directly from Ali, 
the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. In essence, the believer is being urged to 
circumvent the state, which is illegitimate, and to refer instead, to someone familiar with 
the precepts of Islamic law, such as the religious scholars. This would effectively make 
the fuqaha the de facto government and amounts to an open call to rebellion, if not 
revolution.
It appears that in Ayatollah Khomeini’s opinion, one of, if not the greatest responsibility 
the leader has, is to act as judge and to secure justice for his people. Quoting Imam 
Sadiq once more, in response to ‘Umar ibn Hanzala’s question, “What should two Shi’is 
do then, under such circumstances?” - he is referring to the administration by the 
caliphs:
“They must seek out one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is 
permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, 
and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you.”75
Khomeini also attempts to convey that just leadership is actually a burden and not a 
privilege, and that the clerics would assume this position out of a desire to guide the 
community along the righteous path, not for glory or for personal gain. This stands in 
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stark contrast to the “profligate royal ceremonies, […] reckless spending, [and] constant 
embezzlement”76 of the monarchs ruling many Islamic countries. The reference to 
profligate royal ceremonies clearly alludes to the Shah’s coronation ceremony of 1967.77
Khomeini seeks to make this distinction by quoting Imam Ali: ‘Thus the Commander of 
the Faithful says in his sermon in Nahj al-Balagha: “Were it not for the obligation 
imposed one me to take up this task of government, I would abandon it.”’78 Here, 
Khomeini seems desperate to emphasize that if the fuqaha were to assume governance 
over Iran or the Islamic community in general, they would do so out of a sense of 
responsibility rather than out of personal ambition or greed.
Khomeini also seems keen to place responsibility for the all the ills of the Islamic world 
squarely on the shoulders of its corrupt and inept rulers, as well as the imperialists: the 
United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the jews, with whom “the 
historical movement of Islam has had to contend [from the very beginning.”
From the second paragraph of the introduction chapter of Islamic Government, 
Khomeini wastes little time in laying the blame for the absence of a truly Islamic 
government at the feet of “the Jews” and, later, other groups who sought to exterminate 
Islam.
“These new groups began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim countries about 
three hundred years ago […]. It was not their aim to alienate the people from Islam in 
order to promote Christianity among them, for the imperialists have no religious belief, 
Christian or Islamic. Rather, […] they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their 
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materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam 
and its ordinances, and the belief of the people in Islam. They therefore plotted and 
campaigned against Islam by various means.”79
The first eight pages of Islamic Government outline Ayatollah Khomeini’s grievances 
against the foreign powers that have been active in Islamic countries. “The imposition of 
foreign laws on our Islamic society has been the source of numerous problems and 
difficulties,”80 he writes. Furthermore, “[in] order to make the Muslims, especially the 
intellectuals and the younger generation, deviate from the path of Islam, foreign agents 
have constantly insinuated that Islam has nothing to offer.”81 These statements appear 
to absolve all parties other than the “anti-national”82 rulers who have made their fortune 
by allowing the countries for which they are responsible to be exploited by imperialists 
who “carry of [their] oil after drawing it out of the ground”83 and “divide the Islamic 
homeland,”84 or the jews who “[dare] to occupy [Muslim] lands, and to burn the Masjid 
al-Aqsa without the people’s being capable of making an immediate response.”85
In addition to holding jews, great powers, and corrupt rulers responsible for the relative 
poverty of the Islamic countries, Khomeini also appears to absolve the general 
population of any accountability. Instead, the public, particularly the youth and the 
intellectuals who may not have been especially close to Islam, have been manipulated. 
Not only are these groups offered reconciliation, but those who choose not to return to 
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Islam are portrayed as puppets of the imperialist powers. This is true of the 
constitutionalists as well. According to Khomeini:
“[Agents] of Britain were instructed by their masters to take advantage of the idea of 
constitutionalism in order to deceive the people and conceal the true nature of their 
political crimes.”86
Those who supported constitutionalism are also offered a return to the Islamic fold, the 
error of their ways having been illuminated by Khomeini as foreign machinations against 
Islam. As far as the concept of constitutionalism itself goes, Khomeini’s only apparent 
criticism is that the idea is foreign: “[The] basis of the laws that were now thrust upon 
the people was alien and borrowed.”87
In fact, Khomeini’s Islamic Government is replete with nationalist rhetoric. However, he 
simultaneously represents two strands of nationalism: Islamic nationalism and Iranian 
nationalism. In general, Khomeini refers to Islamic lands and their exploitation by foreign 
powers, such as the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel. However, Khomeini 
also makes some veiled references to the Shah and mentions Iran by name on several 
occasions.
In addition, he effectively writes exclusively for a Shi’ite audience. Most of the traditions 
he cites originate with the Imams, of whom only the Prophet himself and Ali are 
recognized universally by Muslims.  Imam Sadiq, for example, who is referenced on 
several occasions, was the 6th Imam, and was not recognized by the Sunni community, 
who form the great majority of Muslims. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the 
message conveyed in his lectures was intended for an audience beyond his students in 
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Najaf, that audience was to be found in Iran. Throughout his writings, “he increasingly 
spoke of the Iranian fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot, and the honorable 
people of Iran.”88 Ervand Abrahamian even postulates that “the nationalistic language, 
together with the use of exclusively Shi'ite symbols and imagery, helps explain why the 
Khomeinists have had limited success in exporting their revolution.”89
Several patterns in Khomeini’s political philosophy can be closely identified with 3rd 
world nationalism found all over the world.90 Khomeini insists that the reason for Iran’s 
woes is its abandonment of its own culture in favor of imitation of foreign ones and the 
importing of foreign ideas. Two parties are responsible for this: the imperialist powers 
who seek to exploit and manipulate Islam, and the rulers who neglect their responsibility 
to protect the nation from being abused. Additionally, this crisis becomes cyclical: 
because the nation abandoned its own culture, it was vulnerable to manipulation; 
Because it was manipulated, it abandoned its own culture.
This narrative serves multiple purposes. First, it externalizes the source of the 
community’s woes. Second, it suggests that the exploitation of the country was 
facilitated by internal actors. This, too, is important, because it implies that without this 
malevolent actor, it would have been impossible to exploit the country. It follows, then, 
that if this person or group is removed, the exploitation of the country will stop. Finally, it 
suggests that the native culture is the solution to the country’s issues. Membership in 
that culture is the least exclusive common denominator, bringing the greatest number of 
people into the fold.
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Khomeini’s challenge, as far as Iran is concerned, however, is crafting an inclusive 
brand of nationalism. Culturally and ethnically, Iran is incredibly diverse. As Ali Ansari 
points out, for example, Reza Shah's attempts at crafting a new nationalism had failed 
because his was an "exclusive ideology of 'Persian' nationalism."91 The one identity 
most the vast majority of Iranians share is their religious one. Most Iranians are 
Muslims, while most Muslims in Iran are Shi’a. In addition to the Persians, the Azeri and 
Arab communities in Iran are largely Shi’a. Khomeini, then, as an Islamic scholar, is 
ideally placed to mobilize the population, doing so by appealing to its Muslim identity.
Khomeini’s narrative continues by putting the Shi’ite clerics at the vanguard of the 
movement to put an end to the imperialist domination of the Islamic lands:
“We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have 
a responsibility in this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is graver 
and more critical. We must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this 
sacred jihad, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in 
the forefront. If we do not have the power today to prevent these misdeeds from 
happening and to punish these embezzlers and traitors, these powerful thieves that rule 
over us, then we must work to gain that power.”92
Here, Khomeini makes it clear that Islamic Government is not simply a theoretical 
exercise. As the chapter titles suggest, Khomeini is offering a program for the 
installation of such an administration, as well as describing what that government’s form 
and limitations might be. Khomeini states:
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“Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional. It is not 
constitutional in the current sense of the word, I.e., based on the approval of laws in 
accordance with the opinions of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the 
rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing, and administering the 
country, conditions set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunna of the Most Noble 
Messenger.”93
This is of great interest, because, according to Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, 
who conducted two interviews with Khomeini at his home in Neauphle-le-Chateau in 
Paris during the upheavals in Iran leading up to the revolution, Khomeini and his 
entourage made a concerted effort to emphasize three points repeatedly: ‘“The rights of 
minorities, the rights of women, and the holding of elections.’”94. It appears, then, that 
the idea of an ‘Islamic Republic’ was a compromise between Khomeini’s ideal of a cleric 
led government and appeals for a representative government. Only by attaching itself to 
the desire for popular representation could the Islamist movement mobilize enough 
people to overthrow the Shah and institute the vilayat-i faqih.
Abrahamian contends that ‘“populism” is a more apt term for describing Khomeini, his 
ideas, and his movement because this term is associated with ideological adaptability 
and intellectual flexibility, with political protests against the established order, and with 
socioeconomic issues that fuel mass opposition to the status quo.95 This is evident in 
Khomeini’s compromise on the issue of popular representation and declaration of an 
Islamic Republic in Iran. That compromise, however, appears to have been merely 
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superficial, intended to mobilize different constituencies against the Shah. Despite its 
highly publicized elections and substantial democratic infrastructure, Iran’s constitution 
ensures that power is vested firmly in the hands of the Islamists, who can reject or 
repeal legislation, as well as disqualify candidates from running in elections on the 
rather subjective basis that they are not Islamic enough. Khomeini demonstrated an 
impressive ability to frame his ideas in such a way as to make them as inclusive 
possible, to adapt them to popular forces, and to mobilize large segments of the 
population whose goals were not entirely compatible with his own.
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Chapter 4: Why Islam?
Exploring the social and structural reasons why Islam was able to assume leadership of the 
Iranian Revolution and assert itself afterward
In the previous chapters, the evolution of Shi'a Islam from opposition movement to pillar 
of the state and back to opposition movement has been explored. The changes within 
Iranian society and advances in technology that made it possible for the clergy to 
network and to mobilize their followers against the Shah have also been reviewed. 
However, another questions begs itself: Why Islam? While the numerous errors 
committed by the Shah have been examined, as well as the progressive alienation of 
every one of the monarchy's traditional constituencies, it is still not entirely clear what 
enabled Islam to assert itself as a legitimate and viable alternative to the monarchy, 
which had existed in Iran for thousands of years.
In this chapter, we will assess the reasons why Islam was able to rise above the other, 
competing ideologies and assert itself as the solution to Iran's problems. Those reasons 
which have been touched upon in the previous chapters will be reviewed briefly in order 
to offer a comprehensive overview of the factors that made Islam such a powerful 
movement.
In doing so, we will begin with the question of identity.
Benard and Khalilzad state:
"The setting in which Islamic Third World countries generally must operate is 
characterized by four overlapping conflicts:
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    1. The North-South conflict, in its material (economic, military, diplomatic) and 
ideological aspects;
    2. The superpower or East-West conflict and the constraints it places on weaker 
countries, particularly those who occupy a "strategic" location as defined by these 
outside powers;
    3. The conflict between traditional and new values and actors; and
    4. The conflict of ideologies."96
As the authors point out, Islam is useful within each of these conflicts. In the first 
instance it connects that society to a pre-colonial history. Meanwhile, in the case of the 
East-West conflict, it offers an "alternate source of identification."97 Finally, Islam offers 
"the society a continuity that transcends"98 the last two conflicts.
It is most useful, perhaps, to begin with the function of Islam in the development of an 
alternative identity during the Cold War, as well as the failure of competing ideologies to 
assume this role. While these ideologies were met with a considerable degree of 
enthusiasm, eventually they were all forced to yield primacy to the Islamist movement.
In addition to having been perceived as a failure after the Constitutional Revolution, 
constitutionalism, as well as republicanism, was held in some quarters to be a Western 
phenomenon. As noted in the chapter on his work, Islamic Government, Ayatollah 
Khomeini had asserted that British agents had been told to spread constitutionalism in 
                                                
96Benard & Khalizad, 1984, Government of God, p25.
97ibid, p26.
98ibid, p26.
57
Iran as a means of concealing their political agenda.99 Furthermore, Iran's Constitutional 
Revolution of the early 20th century had not produced the results Iranians had hoped 
and fought for. Despite the establishment of a parliament, Iran's monarch continued to 
enjoy almost unlimited power. The Oil Nationalization crisis offered Iran's parliament an 
opportunity to redeem itself and to prove its value. However, foreign intervention 
undermined its efforts to overrule the Shah and exposed the relative weakness of the 
institution. While many Western-educated intellectuals continued to promote a stronger 
parliament in Iran, constitutionalism was unable to gather enough momentum to 
overtake Islam as the leading force at the front of the revolutionary movement.
The same is true of socialism. While constitutionalism was associated with the West, 
socialism was linked inextricably with the Soviet Union. Although the Shah's ties to the 
United States of America were well documented (see Chapter 6), Iranians seem to have 
been reluctant to trade submission to one of the two world superpowers for prostration 
before another, particularly as Soviet control was exercised rather more directly. 
Furthermore, unlike the US or Great Britain, the USSR shared immediate borders with 
Iran. It would likely also not have been forgotten that separatist movements in both 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan during the Allied Occupation had been "supported and 
arguably ultimately manipulated by the occupying Soviet forces who encouraged the 
transition from autonomy to separatism, a shift which challenged the integrity of the 
nation."100 As Ali Ansari notes, these movements set a precedent for the integration of 
socialist policies by most political groups in Iran. Ultimately, however, the strident 
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secularism of socialism did not appeal to Iranians.101 It is worth noting here that Russia 
and the Soviet Union do not escape Khomeini's wrath either. In Islamic Government, he 
decries the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, assigning blame to Russia, Great Britain, 
and Austria.102
What is evident, then, is that both constitutionalism/republicanism and socialism had 
major obstacles to overcome in order to assert themselves in what was an increasingly 
nationalist movement. Instead, Ansari notes the "emergence of 'religious nationalism' as 
a political force in the country."103
Benard and Khalilzad observe a phenomenon in Islamic Third World Countries which 
they call "The Radicalization of Tradition." They note that the introduction of new 
political forces and ideologies influenced traditional structures. "Thus leftist ideology 
could combine with ethnic nationalism; [...]; nationalism could combine with religion; 
[etc]."104 One need only consider the views of Ali Shar'iati, whom Ervand Abrahamian 
has called "the main ideologue' of the revolution" and whose political ideology he 
describes as follows:
"Shari'ati drew his inspiration from outside as well as from within Islam: from Western 
sociology - particularly Marxist sociology - as well as from Muslim theology; from 
theorists of the Third World - especially Franz Fanon - as well as from the teachings of 
the early Shi'i martyrs. In fact, Shari'ati devoted his life to the task of synthesizing 
modern socialism with traditional Shi'ism, and adapting the revolutionary theories of 
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Marx, Fanon, and other great non-Iranian thinkers to his contemporary Iranian 
environment."105
During the revolutionary period, Khomeini, too recognized the need to adapt his vision 
of a government of Shi'ite clerics to the demands of the Iranian people. As Benard and 
Khalilzad note:
"To the new social forces that had come into being in the Middle East, the vocabulary of 
the West and the Western media meant that their desire for a voice in government for 
access to decision-making could be articulated as the desire for a parliamentary 
system."106
However, the only democratic mechanism Khomeini mentions in Islamic Government is 
the possibility that if the Islamic jurists recognize one among them as being the most 
just and the most learned, then this faqih may accede to a position of supreme 
leadership. He explicitly states that "Islamic government [...] is not constitutional in the 
current sense of the word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the 
opinion of the majority."107 However, after the Shah had been forced to leave the 
country, Khomeini and the Islamists proposed an Islamic Republic, which was 
confirmed by a referendum without a constitution defining the delegation of powers 
having been proposed, let alone agreed. It seems likely, then, that Islamic Government, 
a series of lectures held in Najaf in 1970, was a purely theoretical exercise. While ideal 
in his view, Khomeini recognized that he would have to adapt the vision he had 
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articulated in Islamic Government  to make it more palatable to a greater portion of the 
population. Sami Zubaida observes:
"In this regard it is significant that Khomeini incorporated one European concept into his 
political vocabulary at the time of revolutionary agitation, that of the 'republic.'”108
This reflects Abrahamian's contention that Khomeini's movement shares many 
characteristics with populist movements.109
Benard and Khalilzad also observe that, in the face of the increasing penetration of the 
region by great powers, four trends followed, of which two are of particular interest here: 
actors "had to survive the aggressive or at any rate encroaching interests of these 
outside powers," and "they could employ the foreign presence as a catalyst and a 
definition point for internal affiliations, in order to unite with each other and/or to play 
different foreign powers off against each other."110 The identification of "imperialism, 
foreign capitalism, and the political establishment" as the sources of a country's 
problems is a central feature of populism.111 It is interesting that Shari'ati observes these 
same features in his history of Shi'a Islam as an opposition movement: Red Shi'ism.112
Ultimately, however, the revolutionary movement was defined by Iran's position as a 
Third World country:
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"The necessity for nationalism, especially in its cultural dimension, which resulted from 
this status made impossible a modernist rejection of those aspects of tradition, which, in 
classical European history, could more easily be labeled reactionary and opposed."113
Islam's status as an organic, home-grown political force gave it a legitimacy that its 
rivals could never claim. However, Islam's position in Iran is unique, even among 
Muslim countries in the Middle East, because of Iran's status as a Shi'ite society and an 
ostensibly Shi'ite state. Despite its eventual demise, the Safavid dynasty had firmly 
established Iran as a Shi'ite nation, which, furthermore, saw itself as the center of the 
Shi'a world. It does not seem unreasonable, then, to suggest that Shi'ism in Iran was 
uniquely positioned, in comparison with other Islamic countries, to connect itself to the 
country's glorious history without having to reject the relatively new concept of the 
nation-state; in fact, it was able to embrace it.
In Khomeinism, Abrahamian refutes the notion that Khomeini is a fundamentalist by 
exploring the characteristics normally associated with fundamentalism and then
countering these claims as they apply to Khomeini one by one. One of his arguments is 
that Khomeini does not reject the nation state.114 Khomeini does decry the separation of 
the Islamic world into small, separate states:
"We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the self-seeking rulers have divided the 
Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic umma
from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great 
Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided."115
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However, as Abrahamian points out, "[Khomeini] increasingly spoke of the Iranian 
fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot, and the honorable people of Iran."116
Sami Zubaida suggests that this is also implicit in Khomeini's Islamic Government, 
contending that Khomeini's argument is based on the assumption of the modern nation-
state with a politically conscious and engaged population.117 In fact, this political 
philosophy would have been conducive, or even necessary, in Khomeini's perception of 
Iran's role in the world. As Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr observes:
"The Iranian state, controlled de facto by the conservatives in the government, promotes 
itself as the Vatican of Shi'ism. It bases its argument on the fact that Iran is a Shi'-run 
state, whereas Shi'i Muslims in other parts of the world live in states that are dominated 
by Sunnis, and so Iran is free to pay near exclusive attention to Shi'i concerns."118
During the Safavid period, Iran was able to effectively appropriate Shi'a Islam. Although 
this is not to suggest that the Shi'a the world over recognize Iran as some sort of center 
of Shi'ite political thought, it appears that the Iranian Shi'a clerics seemed to perceive 
this to be Iran's role. It does not seem illogical, therefore, to assume that these feelings 
are shared by large parts of the population.
Another feature of Islam which is likely to have contributed to its appeal as an 
opposition movement with considerable nationalist credentials is its traditional 
independence from the state. In light of the assertiveness demonstrated by the faction 
of the Shi'ite clergy led by Khomeini in seeking the establishment of an Islamic 
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Republic, it is interesting that one of the factors that may have lent the movement some 
of its legitimacy was its lack of a role in the state. Said Amir Arjomand writes:
"Elsewhere, I have argued that the most important feature distinguishing Shi'ism from 
Sunnite Islam is the separation of political and religious authority, and the corresponding 
autonomy of the religious institution from the state. This separation could, under a 
number of circumstances, induce a negative evaluation of political charisma on the part 
of the men of religion."119
He continues by postulating that there are at least two responses to such a negative 
perception of political power: "pious withdrawal," as observed with the Ayatollahs Ha'eri 
and Borujerdi, or the attempted forced submission of political charisma to the religious 
establishment, as seen with Khomeini. The transition from the first response to the 
second can be roughly summarized as follows: "The legitimacy advantage inherently 
belonging to the ruler is claimed by the opposition, who can argue that precisely they 
have no visible power or possessions, they are morally stronger."120
Furthermore, the esteemed position of the Shi'ite clergy in Iran meant that the state 
could not drive this opposition movement underground. While the clerical establishment 
had, for the most part, been accommodating of the monarchy, it appears that the 
Islamic opposition movement may have been the only one that could be sustained 
without being eventually forced to submit.121 Salehi writes:
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"The security forces had focused mainly on the college community, civil and military 
servants, the large industrial organizations, and other middle-class people who were 
politically concerned. These new activists [the ulama] were not only unknown to the 
authorities, but there was additionally no way to cut their lines of communication. Their 
organization was therefore uncrushable [sic]."122
This was confirmed by Mehdi Bazargan.123
Michael Fischer has also argued that, unlike socialism, constitutionalism, or any other 
political force, Islam was central to the claims to legitimacy by the state.124 Therefore, the 
religious establishment could at any point in time revoke its endorsement of the state, 
as seen during the revolution. In another work, Fischer observes what he calls a 
"Karbala paradigm."125 He defines this as a mechanism "for heightening political 
consciousness of the moral failings of the government." The Karbala paradigm is 
essentially a ready-made narrative that ascribes to the actor in power characteristics 
such as despotism, and also carries connotations of usurpation and personal ambition. 
On the other hand, it implies a righteous posture on the part of the opposition, as well as 
an embrace of martyrdom, a powerful theme in Shi'a history, particularly as it relates to 
the Battle of Karbala. The Shi'a ulama had the greatest access to this device, and, as 
was noted in Chapter 2, Khomeini drew the comparison between the attack on the 
Fayzieh seminary in Qom by the Shah's security forces and the death of Imam Husayn 
at the hands of Yazid ibn Mu'awiyya's forces.
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Perhaps the greatest advantage enjoyed by the Islamic clergy, however, was its lack of 
a pre-existing political platform. This has been touched on by Ervand Abrahamian in his 
assertion that Khomeinism, the political movement led by the Ayatollah, was populist in 
nature. While the other political forces were limited in their ability to adapt to the 
demands of the Iranian people and the revolutionary movement due to a philosophical 
rigidity, the Islamists tailored their demands to popular grievances. Up until that point 
(the Revolution), the only political position with which the clergy had previously identified 
itself was one of constructive opposition - that is to say that its opposition was largely 
directed at policy rather than at the regime itself. The absence of a platform allowed the 
Islamists to tailor their movement around its opposition to the Shah, thereby pleasing 
large parts of the population without alienating itself from any of the significant political 
contingents in Iran, even modernists and secularists, as Benard and Khalilzad observe:
"As the fundamentalists (Khomeini, etc) entered into a dialogue with individuals such as 
Bazargan and Shari'ati and through them acquired access to the modernist and 
secularist intelligentsia, the modernists in turn were amenable to cooperation which 
offered access to the mass of the population to a degree the secularists alone could not 
hope to achieve."126
The historical perception of the Shi'a clergy as a voice of opposition with no real political 
ambition of its own likely endeared it to the other opposition groups, as these would not 
have viewed the clerics as a competing faction, but rather as allies in the struggle to 
remove the Shah. In this manner, the clergy also appear to have acted as somewhat of 
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a bridge between the various political groups which formed the coalition that overthrew 
the Shah.
Another element which contributed to the ability of the Shi'a clergy to assume some 
measure of control over the revolutionary movement was the Shi'a cycle of mourning 
which not only maintained and even heightened the revolutionary fervor in Iran, but also 
imbued it with a distinctly religious tone. It is a tradition in Shi'a Islam - as well as in 
some Sunni societies - to mourn the dead not only immediately after their passing, but 
again 40 days later. The staging of these ceremonies to commemorate the deaths of 
individuals protesting against the Shah's government were highly politicized and 
frequently used as an outlet for criticism of the regime. This, in turn, perpetuated a state 
of mutual antagonism between the state and the protest movement. The mourning 
ceremonies were frequently suppressed, violently, and usually resulted in the deaths of 
some of the civilians. These victims, in turn, were also mourned 40 days later, usually 
resulting in similar violence. Writing in the context of riots that took place in January 
1978, where several people were killed, Chelkowski and Dabashi write:
"Just as Hussein is mourned not only on the 10th day of Muharram but also forty days 
thereafter, it is customary for Shi'ites to mourn the deceased forty days after their death. 
Those killed in the riots were mourned publicly forty days later by the multitudes in 
towns all over Iran. In Tabriz the riot police then fired on the mourners, creating new 
martyrs, and new cycles of remembrances forty days later. Four times this occurred, 
generating a chain reaction of mourning demonstrations and shootings, with more and 
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more people participating every 40 days. That procession of events laid the ground for 
the final assault on the bastion of the Shah's regime."127
Charles Kurzman, meanwhile, points out that 40th day mourning ceremonies do not 
have a history of being politicized,128 either in Iran or Shi'a society in general. This 
suggests that the clergy, or at least the contingent behind the protests, may have 
sensed a heightened vulnerability in the Shah's government, and therefore, an 
opportunity to effect real change.
Khomeini seems to be the first cleric to have exploited the tradition of 40th-day 
mourning ceremony's for the expression of political discontent.129 The speech in which 
he compares the attack by Shah's forces on the Fayzieh seminary in Qom to Husain's 
martyrdom at the battle of Karbala, mentioned above and in chapter 2, was held on the 
40th day after the attack.
Kurzman also introduces the concept of 'critical mass' to his analysis of the reasons for 
the success of the Iranian Revolution. He suggests that Iranians were able to overcome 
their fear of violent repression of their protests by the Shah's security forces because 
they became increasingly aware of the breadth of discontent throughout the nation. 
Disaffection with the Shah's regime also continued to grow as news of the protests and 
mourning cycles, and the state's violent response to them, were increasingly widely 
reported.130
Another crucial way in which the Shi'a clerics also played a part in the ability of Islam to 
position itself at the front of the revolutionary movement was in the mobilization of the 
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extensive network of mosques and seminaries. The network served as a strong and 
efficient way for the opposition to communicate and to coordinate. According to a report 
by the Iranian Ministry of Endowments, there were over 9,000 mosques in Iran in the 
mid-1970s.131
The independence of the Shi'a infrastructure from the state, to which reference is made 
above, made the development of this network possible. Therefore, the network not only 
made it easy for the Shi'a clergy to arrange demonstrations and exchange ideas, it also 
facilitated the raising of funds. Thus, the clerics had both a strong organizational 
capability as well as a solid financial base which the state could not control. 
Furthermore, because this network was institutional rather than personal, it was difficult 
to deter or disrupt its mobilization. Although clerics remained relatively free of state 
suppression, the few instances when they were detained or placed under house arrest 
do not appear to have limited the capacity of the mosque networks to organize the 
opposition. Perhaps the best example of this can be found in Khomeini's continued 
influence despite his being exiled, first to Turkey, then Iraq, and finally France. On this 
subject, Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi write:
"Exile, literal deterritorialization, therefore did not cut Khomeini off from his followers. It 
is ironic to note that improvements in the relations between Iraq and Iran in the mid-
1970s that aimed to settle the border disputes should have helped to strengthen this 
process. The Iraqis agreed to allow up to 130,000 Iranian pilgrims to visit the Shiite holy 
places, second only to Mecca in religious significance, so from 1976 a stream of tapes 
of Khomeini's speeches began to flow into Iran from Najaf, brought back by pilgrims and 
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visitors, and were distributed through the mosque network. The Shah became cognizant 
of this alternative communications network, noted briefly in his memoirs in the terse 
sentence 'cassettes of his [Khomeini's] speeches and harangues were smuggled into 
our country and used by his supporters to incite the masses.'"132
The usefulness of the mosque network, then, is clear.
A further explanation for the success of the Shi'a clergy in mobilizing the people, and, 
therefore, in assuming leadership of the revolution, is the religious model of the marja-at 
taqlid, or 'source of emulation.' According to the concept of the marja-at taqlid, those not 
thoroughly versed in the teachings of Islam should seek out a learned Islamic scholar to 
serve as a reference in matters where they are unsure of the position of Islam. This 
relationship between cleric and believer made it far easier for the clergy to revoke the 
state's legitimacy and to mobilize the people against it. In all likelihood, the Shah's 
awareness of the ability of the clergy to harness popular discontent is responsible for 
the relative absence of repression, if not attempted marginalization, of the religious 
structures in Iran.
Thus, it seems almost inevitable that the Shi'a clergy should have assumed leadership 
of the revolution, and that they should have commanded a substantial following as well. 
During the Cold War. there existed an almost dogmatic dichotomy that forced most 
countries to align themselves with either the East or the West. However, in Iran, both 
carried negative political and historical connotations; The East - Russia and later the 
USSR - had supported separatist movements in the North, among other offenses. The 
West - Great Britain and the United States - had exploited Iran’s economy, and 
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supported the unpopular Shah. Islam, therefore, offered an alternate source of identity, 
independent of East or West. Furthermore, unlike constitutionalism or socialism, Islam 
also claims traditionalist credentials that extend back to Iran’s proud, pre-colonial 
history. Islam, therefore, is an organic political force. The continuity which Islam 
provides also supersedes ideological conflicts, perhaps presaging Islam’s role as the 
unifying factor in the coalition that toppled the Shah. Neither socialism nor 
republicanism or constitutionalism could claim any of these advantages. 
Furthermore, because Islam was not previously a fixed political ideology, it was able to 
adapt and to absorb elements of other popular ideologies, as long as they did not in any 
way contradict the ordinances of Islam. Thus, Shari’ati and Bazargan could ally 
themselves with the Islamists without necessarily having to anticipate future conflicts. 
The Islamists could also construct their platform around the common grievances of the 
Iranian people, rather than propose a positive agenda.133 This flexibility is not only 
invaluable to Islam’s ability to articulate itself in as inclusive a way as possible, but it is 
also arguably unique to Islam. Thus, Khomeini was able to introduce the idea of an 
‘Islamic Republic,’ which had no precedent in Islamic political thought. 
It has also been argued that religious institutions were largely exempted from state 
repression, perhaps due to the prestigious nature of the men of religion. Therefore, the 
mosques and seminaries became something of a headquarters for the revolutionary 
movement. At the same time, the network of mosques provided a strong, independent 
communications infrastructure for the Islamists and the other opposition groups that 
gradually came to align themselves with the them, to organize and to mobilize. The 
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Shi’a clergy also had access to pre-existing cultural narrative of oppression and 
marginalization. So, they could repeatedly make reference to the Battle of Karbala, the 
martyrdom of Husain, and the injustice represented by Yazid ibn Mu’awiyya, an allegory 
which would have been almost universally understood in Iran. The Shi’a clerics were 
also able to exploit cultural practices in order to perpetuate the movement. The cycle of 
40th day mourning ceremonies which had begun following the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s son, Mustafah, is a perfect example. Not only did these ceremonies, which 
were highly politicized, maintain the forward momentum of the movement, they even 
accelerated it. As these ceremonies were violently suppressed, they triggered the 
beginning of another cycle. They also imbued the protest movement with an Islamic 
vocabulary and context. 
The Shi’a social dynamic of the marja-e taqlid is also important. Khomeini’s popularity 
among the populace won him growing numbers of followers in a society that had 
already been structured in a way so that the senior mujtahids exercised considerable 
influence. As Khomeini also won over increasing numbers of the clergy (he was not 
necessarily popular, but rather polarizing, so that while some colleagues embraced him, 
others distanced themselves from him and his policies), so he also won over their 
followers.
Most important, however, in explaining Islam’s supremacy in the revolutionary 
movement, was its history as Iran’s voice of opposition, beginning under the Qajars and 
continuing throughout the Pahlavi dynasty. This legacy gave the Islamic movement 
within the revolution a legitimacy which the other groups could only dream of being able 
to claim. Finally, the fusion of religion and nationalism, whose development Ansari 
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observes as early as the Allied Occupation,134 was crucial in allowing the Islamists to 
appropriate nationalism as their own. Ansari observes: “The dominating ‘principle’ or 
ideology in this period is that of ‘nationalism.”135
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Chapter 5: America's Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Relationship With the US and How It Was Perceived by the Public in 
Iran
In the previous chapters, both the gradual growth of political consciousness of Iran as 
well as the increasing penetration of the country by foreign actors have been discussed, 
as has the nationalism that began to emerge, largely as a result of the two 
aforementioned trends. In the following chapter, the Shah's relationship with the United 
States will be explored, as will the public's perception of that relationship. The analytical 
focus will be on the political crises in Iran and the role the US, and other foreign powers, 
played in them. At the end, the role of Cold War politics in the Shah's relationship with 
America and what effect this had on his public image will also be discussed. We will 
begin by examining the origins of the Pahlavi dynasty, as Shah Mohammad Reza's 
public perception and claim to legitimacy, or lack thereof, was shaped to no insignificant 
degree by the legacy of his father.
In 1921, Reza Khan effectively carried out a military coup against Iran's monarch, 
Ahmad Shah Qajar. He entered the capital, Tehran, together with the Cossack Brigade 
in February of 1921, and had roughly 60 influential politicians arrested. In claiming that 
he was hoping to prevent a revolution, he demanded that his co-conspirator, Seyyed Zia 
Tabatabaie, be named Prime Minister. His order was duly followed. After initially 
occupying the newly created position of Army Commander, Reza Khan was named 
Minister of War in May of the same year, while Seyyed Zia was forced from office. In 
1923, he himself was named Prime Minister, and in 1925, his dominance of Iranian 
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politics was so complete that the Iranian parliament abolished the ailing Qajar dynasty 
and established the Pahlavi dynasty in its stead, with Reza Khan as the country's new 
monarch.136
From the very outset of his regime, Reza Shah had to contend with assertions that he 
had to come to power not only with British approval, but with British support. As 
Abrahamian observes, and as is explored in greater depth in chapter 2, the persistent 
interference in the politics of the country by foreign powers, specifically Great Britain 
and Russia, had left Iranians somewhat predisposed, not unjustifiably, to paranoia 
regarding the machinations of other nations.137 Michael Zirinsky confirms that the British 
did, in fact, assist the coup, though authorship of the coup remains unclear: "British aid 
to the coup was key to its success, and aid to Reza helped him survive; Loraine's policy 
of good relations and nonintervention was part of the process by which Reza came to 
dominate Iran."138 The truth of the full extent of British assistance likely lies somewhere 
in between claims by Reza Khan and his entourage that he accomplished the feat 
himself and his critics' assertions that he was a lackey of Great Britain. Regardless of 
actual fact, Reza Khan had to confront claims that he was a puppet of the British, as Ali 
Ansari suggests:
"[The] continued popular belief in British involvement in the establishment of the Pahlavi 
state was to haunt Reza Shah and his son as much if not more than the 1953 coup was 
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to cause problems of credibility for Mohammad Reza Shah. [...] There was an essential 
crisis of legitimacy which plagued the Pahlavi dynasty from its inception."139
Considerably less controversial is the role played by the British, as well as the 
Americans and the Soviet Union, in the forced abdication of Reza Khan in favor of his 
young son, Mohammad Reza. In 1941, the Allied forces occupied Iran. Reza Khan had 
sought closer relations with Germany during his reign, in large part because he sought 
assistance in the development of the country, but was disinclined to seek this from the 
British or Russians. Closer ties to Germany offered not only a viable source of the 
technical expertise which he had hoped to secure, but also an opportunity to distance 
himself from the British and the Russians and to confirm his nationalist credentials. 
Germany, for its part, had no history of interference in Iran, and very little history of 
imperialism in general. Furthermore, he may have felt that Germany would be 
particularly inclined to help develop Iran in order to help it break from its own rivals, 
Russia and Great Britain.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, however, Britain and the 
USSR established an alliance, and quickly determined that the risk of the Abadan oil 
refinery falling into Hitler's hands or a possible line of Allied supplies to the Soviet Union 
through Iran being severed, as well as the general cultivation of relations with Germany, 
was too great. So, in August of 1941, the Allies invaded Iran and forced Reza Khan to 
abdicate in favor of his son, who they hoped would be more inclined to favor the Allied 
powers, and no doubt felt would be easier to manipulate140. Unlike the slow coup which 
had installed Reza Khan as the Shah of Iran, there could be no question as to the 
                                                
139Ansari, 2003, Modern Iran, p33.
140Eshraghi, 1984, “Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941.” 
76
authors of the premature beginning to the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who would 
have to face even greater challenges to his claims of legitimacy than his father had. It is 
important to note nationalism's continued prevalence as a political force. Meanwhile, the 
extent of the impact that the Allied occupation had on Iran can perhaps be better 
understood in considering that Ayatollah Khomeini refers to it, in the speech held on the 
afternoon of Ashura, 1963. Seemingly completely out of context, Khomeini invokes the
memory of it, simply wishing to emphasize that the Shah answered to foreign 
"masters."141
Ansari also observes an unintended effect of Reza Khan's policy of modernization:
"Much to Reza Shah's irritation, his industrial and educational reforms, as we have 
seen, provided the framework and catalyst for the growth of political awareness."142
Thus, not only would the young Shah have to contend with questions over his 
legitimacy, but also with the growth of that sector of society that challenged that claim. 
Also worthy of mention are the increased exposure of the Iranian public to Western 
ideas through the Allied occupation, as well as through the education of the intellectual 
elite in the West, the growth of newspapers, the proliferation of political parties, the 
effect of radio broadcasts, which were able to reach even the large illiterate portion of 
Iran.
These patterns were crucial in the emergence of oil nationalization as a subject of 
intense public interest. A renegotiation of the oil concession granted to William Knox 
D'arcy by the Qajar king, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, became a priority for Reza Khan's 
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government, and as these failed to produce a satisfactory result and nationalist 
sentiment continued to rise, calls for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC) grew in both pitch as well as frequency. The movement would not 
reach its climax, however, until Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh took the reins. As Prime 
Minister, Mossadegh pushed through legislation stipulating that the AIOC come under 
the control of the Iranian government after further rounds of renegotiations failed. 
Mossadegh's popularity, the source of which seemed to be the fact that he openly 
defied one of the great powers, meant that he was able to accrue greater powers for 
himself and to push through the nationalization of the AIOC even though some 
elements of parliament preferred continued negotiations.
With its position of primacy in the Iranian oil industry under threat, the British. In 1951, 
all British oil workers were expelled from the country. A year later, the British diplomatic 
corps followed suit as relations were officially severed. The British, who had previously 
explored the feasibility of a coup against Mossadegh, no longer had an embassy to 
serve as a base of operations for such a measure. Therefore, they were forced to 
address their concerns to the United States and the new president, Dwight Eisenhower. 
Their case was couched in terms of the ongoing Cold War, exploiting Eisenhower's 
paranoia over the possible spread of communism, particularly in a region that was vital 
to American strategic interests.143 The young Shah was persuaded to issue a farman, or 
decree, ordering the immediate removal of Mossadegh from his post as Prime Minister, 
while mobs were hired to demonstrate against Mossadegh and in favor of the Shah. 
The intention was to imbue the coup with a false sense of popular support and to paint 
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Mossadegh as a demagogue. The organization of the coup and its execution were 
carried out in Iran by American agents. After an initial attempt to remove Mossadegh 
had failed, the Shah fled to Rome. However, a second attempt succeeded where the 
first had not, and Mossadegh was brought before trial and was imprisoned, and later 
placed under house arrest.144 However, the coup against Mossadegh had been 
prophesied in the Iranian political consciousness, and it was, in fact, associated closely 
with the British and the Americans. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's legitimacy had suffered 
another blow.
In the context of the themes which this dissertation has sought to explore, it is worth 
mentioning the role of Ayatollah Seyyed Abol-Ghassem Mostafavi Kashani in both the 
initial success of Mossadegh and his eventual downfall. It should be remembered that 
Ayatollah Borujerdi was generally held to be the most senior cleric in Iran, and widely 
recognized as such by his colleagues. Borujerdi was noted for his close relationship 
with the Shah and for his refusal to be drawn into politics, and was known to have 
attempted to use his influence in religious circles to encourage the rest of the clergy to 
follow his own example. The most prominent cleric to defy Borujerdi's prohibition of 
clerical was Kashani. Kashani's support of oil nationalization was important in 
legitimizing the process, as Sharia law emphatically and explicitly acknowledges the 
right to private property and stipulates that contractual obligations should be met.145
However, Kashani eventually withdrew his support for Mossadegh, perhaps fearing that 
Mossadegh might institute a program of secularization or, more likely, feeling that 
Mossadegh was becoming more popular than the nationalization movement itself. The 
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latter possibility meets Arjomand's model of "negative evaluation of political power by 
religious authorities,"146 which he bases on a Weberian understanding of the church-
state dynamic:
"Whenever hierocratic charisma is stronger than political authority it seeks to degrade it, 
if it does not appropriate it outright. Since political power claims a competing charisma 
of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan."147
What distinguishes the oil nationalization crisis from the preceding crises is the 
emergence of a charismatic individual to appropriate the mantle of nationalist hero for 
himself, thus stripping the Pahlavi dynasty of whatever grasp it may still have had on the 
narrative. The 1953 crisis, meanwhile, marked a transition from Britain to the US as the 
most influential foreign power in Iran.
In 1963, the Shah instituted a series of reforms known as 'the White Revolution.' The 
three principal features of the Shah's program were land reform, women's rights, and 
education. He was strongly urged to do so by the President of the United States at the 
time, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was fearful that the Soviet Union would stir up 
agitation against the Iranian regime among the poor,148 particularly in rural areas that 
had very little contact with the central government. There was considerable poverty in 
Iran, and the president worried that Soviet claims of exploitation and marginalization of 
the poor could be met with an enthusiastic response among Iran's peasantry. The 
aspect of land reform, therefore, was central to the Shah's program. However, April 
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Summit has characterized the relationship between the Shah and the United States as 
decidedly more complex, to the extent that it may have even favored the Shah:
"The story of American relations with Iran during the Kennedy administration is one of 
misunderstandings and missed opportunities. Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi often 
manipulated and thwarted Kennedy's policy toward Iran and used American fears of 
Communism to gain increased financial aid and military support. Disagreements among 
US policy-makers also contributed to an inconsistent policy toward Iran. These factors 
resulted in the bolstering of a dictatorship out of touch with the Iranian people, inevitably 
leading to the revolution that occurred in 1978-79."149
The reforms were largely unpopular in Iran. While the landed aristocracy, who had been 
traditionally aligned firmly with the monarchy, bemoaned the state's appropriation of 
their lands, the same was true of the clergy, who drew a considerable amount of their 
funds from rural villages which were now being threatened by the redistribution of land, 
and many of whom came from families with substantial land holdings.150 However, they 
also objected to what they perceived as the usurpation of their roles in education and 
the ordering of the family in society. Foreign leaders, however, were effusive in their 
praise of the Shah and hoped that other Third World leaders might follow his model of 
top-down reform, thereby challenging the socialist narrative. President Kennedy is said 
to have called the Shah and congratulated him personally.151 However, in light of the 
Iranian distrust of foreign powers, it seems likely that the positive reception the Shah's 
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'White Revolution' received abroad could only have aroused skepticism of its purpose in 
Iran.
The Shah must have been aware that he would be alienating himself from two of his 
oldest and most influential consistencies, the landed aristocracy and the Shi'a ulama. 
However, when measured against the outpouring of popular support he expected to 
receive from the rural peasantry, this would have seemed a small price to pay. The 
Shah also seems to have paid more attention to the foreign press than to domestic 
public sentiment, and would thus not have appeared to have any reason to reconsider 
the wisdom of his program of reforms. He had made two critical mistakes, however: in 
assessing the influence wielded by Iranian social groups, he had favored quantity over 
quality, failing to recognize the power of the groups whose interests conflicted with his 
reforms, and fracturing the long-established relationship between Iran's landed 
aristocracy and the peasantry.
The events surrounding the Shah's 'White Revolution' reveal two important 
developments: the completion of the transformation of the Shah from a reluctant king, 
indecisive and passive, to a megalomaniac, convinced of his own divine mission and 
popularity among his subjects, as well as the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the 
most prominent voice of opposition to the Shah.
That voice would become even more vocal in its criticism of the Shah the following year 
with the passing of the Status of Forces Agreement:
"In 1964, it became apparent that the US state department was seeking immunity from 
prosecution for all American personnel, diplomatic or otherwise, living in Iran. The State 
Department, anxious not to antagonize public opinion, had wanted the agreement to be 
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informally ratified through an exchange of letter between the Iranian foreign ministry and 
the State Department."152
However, the Prime Minister, Ali Hasan Mansur, insisted that the agreement pass 
through the proper channels and submitted the proposal to parliament. The public was 
outraged, as noted by the British foreign office,153 and inevitably drew comparisons with 
the humiliating system of ‘capitulations’ imposed in Iran during the 19th century, when 
Europeans insisted that their citizens be granted a type of exemption from local law 
whereby any verdict or sentencing would have to be co-signed by a representative of 
the home nation, arguing that no formal judicial system existed and that, therefore, 
individuals were at the mercy of each Islamic jurist's respective interpretation of sacred 
law.
Once again, Khomeini was vocal in denouncing the Shah. It is in his speech on October 
27, 1964, that Khomeini arguably first alludes to his vision of a government of clerics:
"If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit this nation to be slaves of 
Britain one day and America the next, [...], they will not permit Israel to take over the 
Iranian economy, [...] they will not permit the government to impose arbitrarily such a 
heavy loan on the Iranian nation. [...]. All of our troubles today are caused by America 
and Israel."154
While the machinations of foreign powers and the subservience of the Shah's 
government to them bear the brunt of Khomeini's diatribe, his program for the religious 
leaders also includes the educational segregation of boys and girls. Khomeini also drew 
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a connection between the ratification of the agreement and the issuance of a loan by 
the US government to Iran of $200 million (US) to be used, in turn, to purchase 
advanced arms from the US.
Baqer Moin, the author of Khomeini's most well-known biography, observes:
"Khomeini's shrewd exploitation of the Shah's American link had found its mark. But 
more importantly, by honing on an issue that affected Iran's sovereignty he had become 
a political leader, the first time that a teaching marja' had achieved such a position."155
What little sympathy had remained for the Shah was lost. The balance of power 
between Iran and the United States appeared to favor America more than ever. Even 
the Shah, on whom the West had previously seemed at least moderately dependent, 
had been forced to pass an unpopular bill which he must have known would not be 
palatable to the public, with only a paltry loan to show for it, a point which Khomeini had 
emphasized.
Arjomand notes two important patterns between 1953 and 1978: the urbanization of Iran 
and the growth of higher education. Both would have factored into the continued growth 
of political consciousness in Iran which has been observed here.156
"The last ten years of Mohammad Rea Shah's reign witnessed the consolidation, 
growth, and extension of the Pahlavi state and the apogee of the Shah's personal 
power. The political and economic power of the state, exaggerated by a dramatic 
increase in oil revenues in the 1970s, masked the weakness of its social foundations."157
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By the time the Shah announced on its behalf that the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries would be more than doubling the price of oil, Iran had enjoyed 
several years of consistent economic growth. However, this growth was predicated 
largely on oil revenues, which had already been rising gradually. Since the 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, those revenues had gone straight into 
the state treasury, meaning that the average Iranian saw little if any benefit from Iran's 
steady economic growth. It is at this stage that the Shah seems to have sensed an 
enormous opportunity. Following the Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Syria, on the 
one hand, and Israel on the other, and the ensuing oil embargo against the US by the 
Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Shah was in 
the unprecedented position of having considerable economic leverage over the West. 
So, in December of 1973, in a press conference at Niavaran Palace, where he hosted a 
meeting of OPEC members, the Shah announced that the price of oil per barrel would 
be quadrupled. At this stage, the Shah was in the unique position of being able to 
portray himself to the West as its friend (who was still supplying it with oil, after all), 
while also being able to acquire the credentials of a nationalist which he had long 
desired by causing even greater difficulties for the US at an already difficult time. It 
seems reasonable to think that the Shah would have been confident that he would be 
able to legitimize his own rule without having to concede the patronage of his American 
ally, whose economic difficulties he was clearly exacerbating. The Shah even became  
more assertive in his stance against the West in the press:
"As far as the Western world is concerned... the era of extraordinary progress and 
income - and an even more extraordinary income - based on cheap oil has ended. They 
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should find new energy sources and gradually tighten their belts. [...] They will have to 
work even harder."158
As a result, Spencer Davidson wrote in TIME Magazine that “the Shah’s power is 
exploding and Americans would be wise to pay attention to his dreams.”159 However, the 
Shah's complete mismanagement of this new wealth would undo or prevent any 
progress he might have otherwise made in attaining the respect of the Iranian public.
The exorbitant rise of oil income flooded the Iranian economy with money it could not 
yet properly absorb and hyperinflation naturally followed. However, rather than accept 
the responsibility for the rising prices of every-day goods, the Shah chose instead to 
assess blame to the bazaar, whom he accused of profiteering.160 The bazaar merchant 
class was not only subjected to enforced price controls, which the Shah intended to 
mitigate the effects of inflation on the working class, but they were also increasingly 
denied access to the state loans and were physically marginalized by the Shah's urban 
planning, which often cut right through the bazaar.161 In doing so, the Shah alienated yet 
another of the monarchy's oldest constituencies.
Throughout this entire period, two further trends in Iranian-US relations had an impact 
on how the Shah was perceived by his people: arms procurements and relations with 
Israel. Throughout his reign, but particularly during the boom years of Iran’s economy in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah purchased large amounts of advanced US 
arms. According to Leslie Pryor (a pseudonym):
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“According to a 1976 report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United 
States sells more arms to Iran than to any other country [a total of $8.3b between 1973 
and 1976, forming] the backbone of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s efforts to expand 
his army, navy, and air force.”162
These purchases must have seemed not only necessary to the Iranian public, but also 
as gratuitous stimulation of the economy of the unpopular United States.
Throughout his reign, the Shah also maintained strong relations with Israel. While it is 
not clear that he did so under US pressure, it must also be understood that this was not 
popular domestically. Although the Palestinian issue may not have been as prevalent as 
it was in many Arab countries, it did resonate with many of Iran’s Muslims to the extent 
that during the Islamic Revolution, the opposition frequently demanded the cessation of 
relations with Israel.163 It is not difficult to imagine that the Shah was encouraged by the 
US, which was heavily invested in Israel’s success, to maintain friendly relations. 
Regardless of his motivation, under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran was not only a 
supplier of oil to Israel, but also a reliable regional ally.164
While the Shah undoubtedly had a close relationship with the United States, claims 
made by his critics that he was a puppet of the American government seem to have 
been slightly exaggerated. This does not change the fact that this was popular 
perception among the Iranian public, which, in the end, is more important than fact.
This is more easily understood in the context of the Cold War, when states were 
generally forced to align themselves with either the US or the Soviet Union. While the 
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Shah was most certainly close to the United States, particularly from 1953 onward, the 
relationship was mutually beneficial, if not necessarily for the common Iranian. The 
outrage caused by the Allied invasion during World War II had demonstrated the degree 
to which Iranians valued their country's independence, and the Soviet Union was 
certainly not preferred to the US, as demonstrated in one of Khomeini's speeches:
"America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse 
than both of them. They are all worse and more unclean than each other!"165
The enforced dichotomy during the Cold War suggests that it would have been difficult 
for the Shah to maintain not only a policy of neutrality, but the perception as well. Given 
that the Soviet Union was based on an ideology that firmly rejected the institutions of 
monarchy and religion, shared a border with Iran, and had previously expressed 
ambitions on Iranian territory, it seems only natural that the Shah would have pursued 
relations with the United States. However, perhaps due to the nature of the way both he 
and his father had come to power, the Shah was particularly vulnerable to scrutiny.
The reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi represents the apogee of the three trends 
which this dissertation explores: the rise of Iranian nationalism, the growing 
assertiveness of the Shi'a clergy in Iranian politics, and the increasing penetration of 
Iran by foreign powers. Interestingly, in the latter case, it may have been the visibility of 
that penetration rather than the foreign presence itself. That presence arguably not only 
accelerated the former two trends, but set them in motion altogether, despite the fact 
that, in reality, the Shah was able to exercise considerable leverage over the US. This 
wass evidenced by his success in continuing to procure arms which were widely held to 
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be superfluous, his control over Iran's oil industry, and his position at the center of the 
world's energy hub.
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Chapter 6: The Renaissance of Iran’s Central Government
Keddie’s model of inverse correlation between ulama power and a strong central government, and 
how despite Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s strengthening of the state, the clerics still came to power
Nikki Keddie has observed an inverse correlation between the power of the ulama and 
the strength of the central government. In Iran, the decline of the Qajar state, therefore 
led to a “power vacuum” which the Shi’a clergy gradually came to fill. This stands in 
contrast to the Ottoman Empire, or Egypt, where the modernization of the military and 
the establishment of a strong, central bureaucracy allowed the state to check the power 
of the ulama.166
In considering the ability of the Shi’a ulama to challenge the state’s claims of legitimacy, 
one must consider two factors which have already been explored in previous chapters: 
the clergy’s monopoly on the interpretation of the sacred texts, including the Koran and 
the hadiths, and the traditional illegitimacy which was ascribed to any state during the 
Greater Occultation of the 12th Imam.
The steadfast belief of the Shi’a in the Imamate is indicative of a pessimistic view of 
human fallibility, as it is rooted in idea that people are incapable of understanding the 
deepest level of truth within the Islamic traditions and scripture. In this regard, Shi’a 
Islam is considerably less egalitarian than the Sunni branch. The function of issuing 
verdicts on these deeper meanings was initially ascribed to the Imams. However, after 
the Greater Occultation of the 12th Imam, the function was gradually assumed by the 
Shi’a clergy, although arguably to a lesser extent. Although not divinely inspired like the 
Imams, the ulama were better versed in Islamic theology and therefore, it was argued, 
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better qualified to attempt to ascertain these deeper truths. This practice is known as 
ijtihad, and implies the application of reason and, to the extent to which it is available, 
precedents in the history of Islam, to determine, effectively, what the Imams would have 
done in a given situation. 
As mentioned previously, ijtihad can only be practiced in cases where no consensus 
has emerged yet. Therefore, the ulama were capable, theoretically, of exercising a
significant degree of influence in these matters, consciously or not. In the 16th century, 
the majority of the Shi’a ulama could assume a posture similar to that of their Sunni 
counterparts arguing that as long as the state supports Islam it is legitimate in order to 
justify their embrace of the Safavid dynasty. However, in the 19th and 20th centuries, as 
the Qajar state which eventually succeeded the Safavids began to decline, the clergy 
were able to return to the original Shi’a conception of legitimate political authority and 
revoke their approval of the state. This, in turn, formed the basis of the ulama’s 
“effective and growing hostility to Iran’s Qajar dynasty in the 19th and 20th centuries.”167
Keddie adds that “religious doctrines change with time and circumstance, more than 
either their adherents or scholars like to admit.”168
Meanwhile, Arjomand argues that in the 20th century, the ulama have been the principal 
proponents of traditionalism, while observing:
“The distinctive feature of traditionalism in 20th century Iran is that it has been a general 
movement for the defense of Islam against Western influence led by the Shi’ite 
‘ulama.”169
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A synthesis of Keddie’s paradigm and Arjomand’s assertion will be attempted here. It 
will be argued that Keddie’s model is perhaps incomplete in that it does not account for 
the will of the Shi’a clergy to fill the “power vacuum” created by the decline of the Qajar 
state. The failures of the Qajars’ central government and the increasingly limited control 
they exerted over the country did, in fact, create a power vacuum. However, this was 
filled initially not only by the clergy, but by foreign actors as well, notably Russia and 
Great Britain. It was therefore not only possible for the clergy to accrue greater powers; 
it also behooved it to rise to the defense of the country and of Islam against the 
influence of the West in all its forms: political, economic, and cultural. It is important 
here, however, to avoid generalizations of Shi’a political thought and the portrayal of the 
ulama as a homogeneous entity. 
Moreover, the penetration of Iran by the West dictated the pace and the discourse of the 
Shi’a ulama’s growing power. Effectively, the circumstances that allowed the Shi’a to 
gradually fill the “power vacuum” created by the declining Qajar dynasty also shaped 
how the Islamic opposition was articulated. In this case, the Shi’a Islamic movement 
was fused with Iran’s emerging nationalism. Therefore, the advancement of the Shi’’a 
clergy’s political claims was sustained, even during the largely effective centralization of 
the state under the Pahlavi dynasty, especially under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. 
The continuing influence which foreign powers were able to exert in Iran, or at least the 
perception that this was the case, remained a vulnerability of the Pahlavi dynasty, and 
was opportunistically exploited by Khomeini during the revolution.
The Centralization of Iran’s Government Under the Pahlavis
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When Mohammad Reza Pahlavi led what was effectively a military coup against the 
Qajar dynasty, he must have been aware of the weakness of the government. When he 
then came to power, it seems only natural that one of his first orders of business and 
highest priorities would have been to remedy this by modernizing state institutions such 
as the military, the bureaucracy, etc. According to Reza Arasteh:
“In his haste to modernize Iran, Reza Shah abolished many long-established customs 
and institutions. He was himself a soldier and unlike the ruling aristocracy, and the 
upper-class intellectuals of his day, he did not feel bound to honor traditions or to 
proceed cautiously. His aim was to bring a European pattern of life to Iran, and to 
achieve these ends in a short time he imposed a strong centralized administration on 
the country and suppressed and limited local groups which might offer resistance to his 
reforms. [...] To eliminate any possible opposition from [the ulama], Reza Shah 
abolished the waqf (ecclesiastical property) from which they had traditionally derived 
their income, and henceforth they were financially dependent n the government. 
Furthermore, the training of the clergy was taken over by the state and a School of 
Theology was established as part of the University of Tehran.”170
Religion was discouraged in general. Reza Shah also insisted that a police officer be 
present at the meeting of any guild organization, while local political entities increasingly 
lost their autonomy.
“In tearing down traditional patterns, Reza Shah attempted to forcibly substitute national 
unity and modernization by three vehicles of change: a strong army, a modern 
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transportation and communication system, and lastly an efficient government 
administration staffed by educated civil servants.”171
Meanwhile, the state gradually began to introduce export tariffs and to impose taxes, 
instituting a more modern state treasury. One of Reza Shah’s highest priorities was to 
reform the country’s judicial system. The humiliating regime of ‘capitulations’ had been 
imposed on Iran by foreign countries based on the subjective nature of the Islamic 
courts which had been prevalent at the time. By establishing a modern judicial system, 
therefore, Reza Shah was not only moving forward with his program of modernization, 
but establishing his credentials as a nationalist as well. He was also antagonizing the 
ulama even further, however, by appropriating one of their traditional functions within 
society.
Arjomand’s assertion that the Shi’a clergy operated as a force for traditionalism in the 
20th century can thus also be understood in another way; Akhavi states that the ulama
were concerned primarily with the protection of their own cultural and social privileges:
“Defensiveness as a reaction to macro-scale, long-term secular changes which have 
their root in the Western impact upon Iran is understandable, given the dual role of 
‘ulama: (a) guardians of the traditions of the prophet and the imams; (b) protectors of 
the resources of the community against non-believer exploitation of this wealth.”172
Interestingly, Mohammad Faghfoory has differentiated within this period and observes 
three phases in state-ulama relations under Reza Sha from 1921-1941. The first, from 
1921 to 1925, reflects a period of mutual accommodation: Reza Shah assured the 
ulama that he would consult them in the affairs of the state, and in exchange, they 
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supported him in his accumulation of power. Simultaneously, their own influence rose 
sharply, due mostly to Reza Shah’s continued compliance with their wishes, after they 
had largely withdraw from politics following the Constitutional Revolution. The second 
phase of Faghfoory’s model runs from 1925 to 1927. This phase is characterized by the 
maintenance of similar public postures on the parts of both Reza Shah and the ulama; 
however, at this point in time, Reza Shah had already come to power and was now 
looking to neutralize the threat which the clergy posed to himself and his program, but 
he could not yet act on these ambitions. Instead, this period is marked by the 
consolidation of power by Reza Shah. The third and final phase spans the period from 
1927 to 1941, when Reza Shah was forced to abdicate the throne to his son. This 
phase is characterized by the progressive modernization and the marginalization of the 
ulama:
“Military, fiscal, judicial, and educational reforms removed the ulama from the central 
position of power that they had continuously occupied in Iran until 1920. The shah 
replaced them with military officers, bureaucats, lawyers, teachers, and modern-
educated intelligentsia. Not surprisingly, the ulama, once considered to be the 
conscience of the society, began to resist the challenge to their power and status, 
promptly being identified by the shah as defenders of backwardness and reaction.”173
Thus, the power of the Shia’ ulama had been drastically circumscribed by the changes 
imposed by Reza Shah on the Iranian society, culture, and economy. However, the 
series of reforms instituted by Reza Shah suffered from three major flaws: they had 
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been enforced too suddenly and too quickly; they were largely superficial; and they 
were institutionalized too closely to the personality of the Shah.
Ansari contends that the “nationalist agenda” superseded the implementation of some 
of the reforms, such as the establishment of a new judicial system including both a new 
legal code as well as a new profession, in a realistic amount of time.174 Meanwhile, Amin 
Benani has observed of Iran’s economic reforms under Reza Shah: 
“An appetite for industrialization far beyond the bounds of economic rationale, not for 
the sake of efficiency and welfare, but as a symbol of prestige and status.”175
In a speech at the opening of the aforementioned Courts of Justic, Reza Shah is quoted 
as having said: 
“It is not necessary for me to mention the effect of judicial reforms on the progress of the 
national welfare and how these reforms contribute to the national prestige.”176
One effect of this emphasis on prestige was that many of the reforms and programs of 
modernization were superficial, or cosmetic. For example, the centralization of all 
commerce in Tehran and its status as the national capital, and, therefore, the country’s 
most visible city meant that while “Tehran received electricity, broad, paved avenues, 
and a variety of state buildings [...] improvements in provincial cities were much more 
limited.”177 Reza Ghods also reports that:
“The Trans-Iranian Railroad was, like the rest of the Shah’s economic program, more a 
symbol of Iran’s national pride and independence than an economic benefit to the 
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country. [...] The railroad was a financial burden on Iran far out of proportion to its 
benefits.”178
Banani characterizes cosmetic achievements such as these as an “indiscriminate 
imitation of the surface gloss of Western societies.”179
The third flaw of Reza Shah’s modernization program, as mentioned above, was that it 
was inextricably linked with the person of the monarch himself. This manifested itself in 
every area of reform. For example, Reza Shah more than tripled the size of the military 
while multiplying its budget by five and offering its officers greater salaries.180 The 
economy, too, was channeled through the state, and through Reza Shah himself, to the 
extent that all industrial plants during his time as shah were owned either by him or by 
the Iranian government - ironic, considering that he outlawed the Tudeh party, Iran’s 
leading Communist political organization. Meanwhile, monopolies for some of the 
country’s most important commodities, such as sugar, tea, and opium, were awarded to 
those who had curried favor with Reza Shah. Of the establishment of a national bank, 
Ghods writes:
“The National Bank of Iran, or Bank-i Melli, was created to make loans to industry at a 
lower rates than had been current in the bazaar [and] designed as a tangible symbol of 
the country’s financial integrity, and replaced the (British) Imperial Bank in printing 
currency. However, unlike the traditional bazaari creditors, the National bank did not 
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grant loans to credit-worthy bourgeois enterprises, but to the Shah’s favorite projects 
and his relatives and associates.”181
The Shah also went to great lengths to consolidate his power, not by campaigning for 
the support of key constituencies and social groups, but by undermining competing 
sources of power. The way in which he sought to co-opt the Shi’a clergy and to deprive 
it of an independent power base has already been examined. However, he also made 
Iran’s Communist and Socialist parties illegal, as well as the various incarnations of the 
Progress Party, whose ideology was based more or less on an unconditional support of 
the Shah and his programs. Prominent political figures in the Majles were also banned 
from politics. 
One of Reza Shah’s other policies over the course of his modernization program that is 
also worth mentioning is the outsourcing of some state functions. Notably, the Bank 
Melli was initially run by a German, Dr. Kurt Lindenblatt, while the first adequate school 
of medicine in Iran was run largely by French doctors182 and a hospital in Mashhad was 
founded and operated by German doctors.183 The construction of the Trans-Iranian 
Railroad was also undertaken mostly by Western engineers.
The close identification of the state with Reza Shah would have two important effects: 
he would become increasingly unpopular, and the power of the state would suffer when 
he was removed by the Allied Occupation, allowing for the emergence of political 
pluralism on an as yet unprecedented level. It is likely that the former was exacerbated 
by Reza Shah’s cultivation of nationalist sentiment, in contrast to the frequent employ of 
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foreigners to run important state institutions and the perception that his reforms did not 
represent a program of modernization, but rather of Westernization.
However, the reign of Reza Shah should absolutely be understood as the reversal of 
the long-running decline of the Iranian state. The clergy, among many other social 
groups, were politically marginalized or suppressed. The failure of the Pahlavi 
government to maintain this momentum after the Allied Occupation during World War II 
and the abdication of Reza Shah can be attributed largely to the close identification of 
the state and its institutions with Reza Shah himself. 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, his son and successor, was neither as shrewd nor as 
ruthless as his father, and was therefore unable to exert the same force of personality 
on the state. He has also been characterized as callow and weak-willed. Sam Falle, a 
former British diplomat to Iran makes the following observation in his memoirs:
“He has no moral courage and succumbs easily to fear.”184
Instead:
“The young Mohammed Reza Shah concentrated his attention on sports cars, race 
horses, and women. He became a fixture of the international party set [...]. Several 
times, he tried to consolidate his shaky position at home through repression and vote-
rigging, but succeeded only in making himself a figure of ridicule. Newspapers called 
him a lackey of the British. Public rallies were held to dencounce him.”185
He seems, therefore, to have been particularly ill-suited to assume the role that his 
father had established for the Iranian monarch. The state, which had over the past 15 
years come to be closely associated with Reza Shah, a remarkably strong personality, 
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suffered when it was deprived of such a forceful individual. The period from 1941, when 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi acceded to the throne, to 1953, when the Shah perhaps first 
perceived that his power and position were under threat, is marked by a proliferation of 
political parties, newspapers, and other media that were effective in raising the political 
consciousness of the public. It could be argued that the early years of Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi’s reign represented a recurrence of the power vacuum that had occurred under 
the Qajars in the 19th century, and on which Keddie bases her model of fluctuations in 
ulama power.
That “power vacuum” was exploited, however, not by the ulama, in this instance, but by 
various nationalist political forces. Most prominent among these were the Tudeh party 
and the National Front. The relative quietism of the clergy at this time can, in all 
likelihood be attributed to the influence of Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi. Borujerdi 
is widely acknowledged to have come to an arrangement with the young shah, 
promising not to interfere in politics and to support the monarchy, while, in exchange, 
the shah would relax the secular policies of his father. Borujerdi is also believed to have 
promised to attempt to quiet his more politically inclined colleagues. In fact, Ayatollah 
Abol-Ghassem Kashani is the only prominent member of the ulama to have openly 
contravened Borujerdi’s instructions to remain aloof of politics. During the 1953 oil 
nationalization crisis, he was “virtually alone among the leading mujtahids in joining 
Mossadeq, [and] provided a crucial ally to the nationalists.”186 His reason for distancing 
himself from Mossadegh, and then publicly criticizing him viciously, was likely the fact 
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that Mossadegh enjoyed increasingly broad public support, and that he was seen by 
some to be accruing too much power for himself.
The emergence of a strong, secular opposition in many ways signalled that Reza 
Shah’s reforms had been successful, though perhaps not as he had intended; not 
because the National Front of Mossadegh displaced Islam, but because it suggested a 
diversification of political forces. 
Having seemingly recognized that his style of rule, or lack thereof, was untenable, and 
that emerging political forces would otherwise slowly appropriate his powers, the shah 
set about consolidating his power. According to Ansari, the first stage of consolidation is 
characterized by the strengthening of the military, the “ruthless suppression of Tudeh 
activities,” and an attempt to cast himself as a nationalist hero and “to fill the apparent 
vaccum left by Mossadeq.”187 By the end of the 1950s, the Shah’s position was not 
nearly so precarious. He had successfully re-established closer ties with his traditional 
constituencies, increased the size and budget of the military considerably and 
established SAVAK, the state security service. In addition, he had eliminated General 
Zahedi as a political rival (whose military pedigree had made him particularly 
dangerous), successfully suppressed the opposition political organizations, avoided 
antagonizing the ulama, and sufficiently depoliticized society so that the coup against 
Mossadegh largely faded from the political consciousness.
However, the death of Borujerdi and the termination of the Shah’s tacit understanding 
with the clergy would be the first in a series of events that affected this dynamic. 
Ayatollah Khomeini had been a student of Borujerdi’s, and had even served as his 
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teaching assistant and personal secretary.188 As early as 1943, Khomeini had published 
Kashf al-Asrar, which was:
“an unsigned tract [attacking] contemporary secularists, particularly Reza Shah, Shariat 
Sangalaji (a reform-minded cleric who had openly supported the previous monarch), 
and Ahmad Kasravi.”189
So, when the Shah instituted a series of reforms known as the ‘White Revolution’ in 
1963, Khomeini was no longer bound to refrain from entering the political fray. He 
immediately denounced the Shah’s program, particularly the provisions that allowed 
women to vote and to stand in elections, appropriated land from the landed aristocracy 
(including large parts of the ulama), and provided for a greater role for the state in 
education in rural areas, where religious institutions had previously been the primary 
source of education. In a meeting with other clerics, Khomeini is said to have argued:
“What is happening is a calculated plot against Iranian independence and the Islamic 
nation, and it is threatening the foundation of Islam. [...] Now we face the shah himself, 
who is poised between life and death. [...] We are duty-bound to resist him because 
what now threatens the people is of such enormity that it cannot be ignored or faced 
with indifference.”190
Khomeini was forced to go into exile the next year when his criticism became even 
more vocal following the ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United 
States. However, he had entered the political consciousness of the nation. His new, 
high profile would later facilitate his leadership role in the Islamic Revolution. 
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Ansari notes that, ironically, the ‘White Revolution’ was, in fact, intended to further 
consolidate the Shah’s rule:
“The Shah was anxious to be seen not only as a ‘democratic’ monarch, progressive and 
benign, always with the welfare of his people in mind - a characterization he had 
pursued to varied effect in the post-Mussadiq period - but as a ‘revolutionary’ monarch. 
In doing so, he would appropriate the myths of the Left and the National Front as a 
champion of revolutionary nationalism which would assist in legitimizing himself and his 
dynasty.”191
As discussed in the previous chapter, its actual effect was to alienate the social classes 
usually linked with the monarchy, thereby depriving the Shah of his traditional power 
base. These included the landed aristocracy, the ulama, and the bazaar. By 
implementing the ‘White Revolution,’ the Shah was taking a calculated risk in that he 
must have known that he would be discarding his traditional constituencies, while 
hoping that he would be able to co-opt the general population in their place. The social 
and economic dislocation caused by the ‘White Revolution’ is discussed in Chapter 7, 
and prevented him from accomplishing this objective and depriving him of any popular 
power base.
However, the Shah still presided over a powerful military and police force, and had the 
feared SAVAK at his disposal, as well as an immense bureaucracy. He was also 
insulated from criticism and discontent by the enormous revenues generated by the oil 
boom. 
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Charles Kurzman posits that a social scientific approach to identifying the causes of the 
Islamic Revolution falls short for the following reason: it seeks to adapt the conditions of 
the revolution to a paradigm that recognizes five “main explanations offered by studies 
of revolution:” political, organizational, cultural, economic, and military.192
He argues that while each of these explanations is in some way useful, each is on its 
own insufficient. For example, the economic explanation implies that the rapid inflation 
that was caused by the oil boom and led to a recession in 1977 might have been 
responsible for the revolution. However, Kurzman argues that the recession was not 
considerably worse than previous economic downturns, and that the groups most active 
during the revolution were not those most affected by it. Instead, he offers a synthesis of 
these explanations: the relaxation of political control, under some pressure from former 
US President Jimmy Carter, offered an opportunity for constructive193 mobilization; the 
network of Shi’a mosques furnished the movement with the organizational capacity 
necessary to be relevant; the movement was able to draw on prevalent themes in Shi’a 
culture, such as martyrdom and righteous indignation at the exercise of ‘unjust’ rule, as 
evidenced by the comparisons drawn between the Shah and the Ummayad caliph, 
Yazid ibn Mu’awiyya; the recession caused by the inflation that ensued after the oil 
boom provided a context for the opposition that was current, and democratized the 
movement by expanding the number of those involved; and, finally, the Shah failed or 
declined to use the full extent of his military and security organizations to suppress the 
movement.
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Kurzman adds a further explanation, however; what he calls an “anti-explanation, [...] an 
attempt to understand the experience of the revolution in all its anomalous diversity and 
confusion.”194
His conclusion is that a decisive factor was the emergence of “viability,” or critical mass. 
Effectively, the demonstrations continued to gather momentum even after the Shah 
resumed his repression of political activism because the nation became increasingly 
aware of its cumulative mutual discontent. The prevalence of mass media and the 
imposition of martial law ensured that the magnitude and frequency of the protests were 
known to almost everyone. One central thesis of collective behavior theory is that 
potential protesters are strongly influenced by their perceptions of other potential 
protesters and the likelihood that these will also eventually engage.195 The emergence of 
Khomeini as the voice of the movement may have also affected perceptions of the 
movement’s viability, by introducing a strong alternative to the Shah and to the 
monarchy.
In the end, the Shah had attempted and, to a considerable degree, succeeded in 
imitating the patrimonial structure of the state around himself and the institution of the 
monarchy. The state, therefore, was largely a reflection of himself. Under his father, this 
relationship had manifested itself in a relatively strong state. While on the surface, the 
institutions of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s state were even stronger, particularly the 
military, they were only as strong as the Shah. Part of the Shah’s perceived strength lay 
in the support he received from the United States. However, the election of Jimmy 
Carter on a platform of human rights may have undermined this perception:
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“We didn’t expect Carter to defend the shah, for he is a religious man who has raised 
the slogan of defending human rights. How can Carter, the devout Christian defend the 
shah?”196
Perhaps most striking is the Shah’s reluctance to use the instruments of repression at 
his disposal to their fullest extent. Despite this wealth of repressive resources, the Shah 
seems to have been reluctant to use them. Some have attributed this to the Shah’s 
cancer, claiming that his “medication made him depressed and listless.”197 However, in a 
series of interviews with military and civilian administrators, Gholam Afkhami found that 
the Shah was reported to have been similarly reluctant to use excessive force in the 
crises in 1953 and 1963, long before he was diagnosed with cancer.198 It seems far 
more likely that the Shah had deluded himself into believing that he was a popular, 
constitutional monarch.199 Khomeini had become aware of this, saying that the “Shah 
lives in a morbid dream world.”200 When the demonstrations became increasingly 
frequent and increasingly diverse, he seems not to have known how to react. Wholly 
unprepared for the massive demonstrations taking place, he turned to the US for 
guidance. One of his closest and most reliable advisers, Asadollah Alam, had died in 
1977, leaving him surrounded largely by sycophants who bought into the myth of the 
Shah’s invincibility.201 The US, however, was already hedging its bets and had opened a 
dialogue with the opposition. Competing advice from the US ambassador and the 
national security adviser, Zbigniew Brezsinksi, further complicated the Shah’s decision 
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making and may be partly responsible for his policy of simultaneous repression and 
concessions. In fact, when the US did issue a public statement of support for the Shah, 
this was rather more harmful than helpful, as the “opposition, for its part, considered the 
Shah a lackey of the United States.”202
Thus, Keddie’s model of inverse correlation between a strong government and the 
growth of ulama power can be successfully applied to the Islamic Revolution as well. In 
this case, despite the apparent institutional strength of the Pahlavi state, its patrimonial 
structure, inextricably linked with the person of the Shah, meant that his vulnerability 
was the state’s vulnerability as well. It has been shown that the Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi was not a particularly strong ruler, and that his will to exercise control over Iran 
was rooted in a self-fabricated myth that he was almost universally loved and respected 
in his country. When this myth was exposed during the revolution by the participation in 
the protests of nearly every segment of society, he seems to have lost the will to rule, 
and as he fell, so did his government.
What distinguishes the Islamic Revolution from the gradual shift in power from the state 
to the ulama under the declining Qajar state is the aggressive, subjugation of the state. 
Arjomand cites Weber’s assertion that:
“Whenever hierocratic charisma is stronger than political authority it seeks to degrade it, 
if it does not appropriate it outright. Since political power claims a competing charisma 
of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan.”203
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Khomeini’s attack on the Shah and the institution of monarchy are unprecedented in 
modern Iranian history. Many sociologists, such as Theda Skocpol, for example, are 
dismissive of the impact of individuals in the study of revolutions:
“In the first place, an adequate understanding of social revolutions requires that the 
analyst take a nonvoluntarist, structural perspective on their causes and processes.”204
It is hoped that in the previous chapters it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the 
Islamic Revolution represents the culmination of important several trends that 
significantly predate the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as well as the Pahlavi 
dynasty altogether. However, while a structuralist approach is certainly useful in 
identifying the root causes of the revolution, the roles of individuals within them should 
not be ignored. 
In the case of the Islamic Revolution, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini acted as the catalysts. As has already been discussed, the Shah 
exacerbated the difficulties already facing the institution of monarchy in Iran and, by 
discarding what little support remained for him, essentially united the nation against 
himself. However, due to the close identification of the state with the monarchy and the 
Shah’s own personality, even this assertion does not contradict an emphasis on the 
structuralist approach; the Shah was a structure unto himself.
Khomeini’s role is perhaps more controversial. Ervand Abrahamian, for example, credits 
Ali Shari’ati as the “ideologue” of the revolution. However, Shari’ati had died shortly after 
the revolutionary movement began to gain momentum and long before it reached its 
zenith. As was explored in Chapter 4, Islam was uniquely positioned to organize and to 
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lead the protests against the Shah. It could, therefore, be argued that Khomeini simply 
represented the personification of the that institution. According to Mehdi Bazargan, the 
interim Prime Minister in the provisional government set up by Khomeini following the 
success of the Revolution, the “vilification of the Shah and his regime were more 
important than the glorification of Khomeini. For every slogan for Khomeini, there were 
probably two or more against the Shah.”205
However, Khomeini’s strident criticism of the Shah had furnished him with a legitimate 
claim to the leadership of the movement that no one else could match, while his 
uncompromising stance (matched by the Shah) ensured that the movement would end 
only with the removal of the Shah or the destruction of the protesters. Based on 
Khomeini’s assertion that the Shah “lives in a morbid dreamworld,” it does not seem 
unreasonable to think that he would have calculated that the Shah would effectively 
concede defeat once he became aware of the scale of discontent among the 
population. Khomeini is generally recognized as having been incredibly politically 
astute.206
Khomeini plays an important part in notion concept introduced by Kurzman of “viability” 
in the movement. He was not only fearless in denouncing the Shah, as well as able to 
mobilize massive crowds against him, but he seemed to be capable of leading the 
country beyond the removal of the Shah; This is evidenced by the considerable support 
for the Islamic Republic in the referendum of 1979. Furthermore, the roles of Ha’eri and 
Borujerdi should not be dismissed 
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Keddie’s model, based on a review of relations between the state and the ulama under 
the Qajar dynasty, continues to apply in 20th century. However, this period is marked 
first by the revival of a strong government under Reza Shah, and only later by another 
government that, while structurally strong, was in fact onl strong as long as the Shah 
was perceived to be strong. If one also assumes that Khomeini is representative of the 
ulama, then Keddie’s paradigm accurately predicts this dynamic.
Moreover, while a structuralist approach to the Islamic Revolution is particularly useful -
as a study of the revolution is thoroughly incomplete without it - a review of the actors is 
also instructive: not only of the Shah or Ayatollah Khomeini, but Ali Shari’ati and others 
as well. The Shah’s reticence, for example, and the role of Shiari’ati in synthesizing 
Islamist and socialist discourses should not be dismissed. Khomeini, however, as a 
persistent and vocal critic of the Shah for many years, commanded the respect not only 
of the Islamists, but of most of the opposition movement as well. The fact that Khomeini 
had been forced into exile lent him even further credibility. 
So, while structurally Iran may have been predisposed to a revolution, the actions taken 
by individuals, primarily Khomeini and the Shah, accelerated the trend of growing ulama
power and declining state power, and reaching its zenith in the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic.
110
Conclusions
Five trends and their role in the Iran’s Islamic Revolution
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to offer an explanation for Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution that takes into account the country’s history and culture, as well as 
the development of political trends. We have identified five main trends that offer some 
level of explanation for the events of 1977 to 1979: the decline of the Qajar government; 
following on from this are the penetration of Iran by Great Britain and Russia (and later, 
the United States), and the growing power of the ulama and their emergence as a voice 
of political opposition; the overall growth of political consciousness; and, finally, the rise 
of nationalism as the dominant political discourse in Iran. In many ways, these 
processes can be understood as products of one another, and while some would, in all 
likelihood, occur independently of the other process, they are still shaped by each other 
to some extent.
The weakness of the Qajar dynasty created a power vacuum which, according to 
Keddie, was filled by the ulama. However, the concurrent penetration and exploitation of 
Iran by Russia and Great Britain suggests that Keddie’s model is incomplete, because it 
does not acknowledge that these also filled that vacuum. Furthermore, her model does 
not account for the incentive of the ulama to fill this vacuum. The growth of political 
consciousness, meanwhile, can, at least in part, be attributed to the penetration by the 
West in two ways: the physical exposure to the foreign presence and the visibility of its 
exploitation of the country and the resultant dislocation of some parts of society, as well 
as the exposure to Western ideas, including constitutionalism, liberalism, and, most 
importantly, nationalism. It is also likely that the political activity of the Shi’a ulama would 
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have raised political awareness to some degree. Meanwhile, the exposure to the 
concept of nationalism must have been exacerbated by the simultaneous exploitation of 
Iran, to which it became the prevailing response. The defiance of and submission to 
foreign powers became integral parts of political debate, as claims of the former were 
made by those seeking power, while charges of the latter were leveled against political 
rivals. The pursuit of this narrative dominated Iranian politics in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.
Chapters 1 through 7 have sought to reveal aspects of Iranian and Shi’a culture and 
history that put the events and developments preceding the Islamic Revolution into a 
proper context. In chapter 1, the exclusive nature of legitimate political authority in the 
Shi’a conception was discussed. It was also revealed that this conception had been 
strengthened by persistent and often violent harassment of the sect throughout Islam’s 
early years. The emergence of the Safavid state was then reviewed. It was suggested
that the creation of the Safavid dynasty was a watershed moment not only in the history 
of the Shi’a branch of Islam, but in Iran’s history as well. The rise of the Safavid state 
produced a complete and serious revision of the Shi’a conception of authority. It was 
noted that the new conception closely mirrored the traditional view of the Sunnis, in that 
as long as the state provided security for the Shi’a and advanced the faith, it would have 
the support of the ulama, on whom it depended for legitimacy. Furthermore, this also 
represents the first and perhaps only precedent for the arrangements which Ayatollahs 
Ha’eri and Borujerdi are believed to have come to with successive Pahlavi shahs in the 
20th century.
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In chapter 2, we examined the historical role of the Shi’a clergy as a voice of opposition 
in Iran during the 19th and 20th centuries. Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi’s fatwa that 
prohibited the use of tobacco as a response to the issuance by the Qajar king Naser al-
Din Shah, of a concession on its harvest, production, and sale to an Englishman 
represents the first significant instance of the clergy’s defiance of the declining Qajar 
government. In the early 20th century, a movement for the institutionalization of a 
constitution in Iran began to gather momentum. This movement was largely supported 
by the ulama who sought to circumscribe the powers of the Shah and prevent the 
further exploitation of Iran by foreign powers, and most prominent among these was 
Ayatollah Khorasani. It was also pointed out, however, that some other clerics were 
vehemently opposed to the constitutional movement, if not to the limitations it placed on 
the Shah’s power. Among these clerics, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri was most prominent. He 
had sought to limit the impact of the Constitutional Revolution and to replace the newly 
established parliament with a council of mujtahids who would act as consultants to the 
monarchy and have the right to veto policy and legislation which they felt abrogated the 
sacred laws of Islam. It was also observed that both Khorasani and Nuri had studied 
under Ayatollah Shirazi, evidence of the independence the ulama were able to exercise 
in coming to a decision on certain matters and to the heterogeneity of Shi’a political 
thought. It was then recorded that, during the oil nationalization crisis in Iran in the early 
1950s, Ayatollah Kashani had initially supported Mossadegh’s initiative, and had even 
issued a fatwa exhorting his followers to support the program as well. One of them went 
so far as to assassinate the Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara, who was largely held to be 
ineffective and unwilling to stand against Britain’s exploitation of Iran. Finally, the clerical 
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response to the Shah’s reform program known as the ‘White Revolution, and the 1964 
Status of Forces Agreement with the United States were discussed. Easily the most 
prominent critic of the Shah and opponent of these policies was Ayatollah Khomeini, 
whose political thought is explored in greater depth in the next chapter. However, the 
political thought of Ahmad Naraqi is considered first. Naraqi is considered one of the 
pioneers of the concept of vilayat-i faqih, whose primary contribution is the development 
of a doctrine which affords the Shi’a fuqaha an even greater freedom to speculate on 
the meaning of religious texts and traditions.
Chapter 3 reviewed Khomeini’s most famous and most important work, Islamic 
Government. It considered Khomeini’s conception of the structure of an  Islamic 
government, or the absence of such a conception. Khomeini’s argument in favor of the 
implementation of his vision was considered, and was found to be based on three main 
arguments: the Prophet and the Imams stipulated that the clerics should assume their 
functions after them; in order for a Muslim king to rule in accordance with the laws of 
Islam, he must consult those most learned in Islamic law, the fuqaha - therefore, the 
power is, in fact, already vested in the fuqaha and ought to devolve to them officially; 
finally, and perhaps most importantly, Khomeini cites the current political plight of Iran 
and of the Muslim world at large and makes two claims important to the trends which 
are discussed in this dissertation: that foreign powers are exploiting Iran, economically 
as well as politically, and that the rulers of Muslim countries are complicit in this. His 
thinly veiled reference to the Shah and to current patterns of activity in the country, such 
as the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources, suggest that Islamic Government is not 
based purely on theory, but is instead a response to the political realities of Iran and the 
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rest of the Muslim world, and that the institutionalization of the vilayat-i faqih is not only 
a matter of principle, but rather necessary in order to protect Iran and Islam.
While chapters 1 through 3 seek to explain how Shi’a Islam in Iran came to adopt such 
an assertive posture in the late 20th century, chapter 4 seeks to explain why it was so 
successful and why it enjoyed such popular support. In considering numerous theories, 
each was found useful but incomplete in rationalizing the success of the Islamists during 
the revolutionary movement. Some of the theories that were put forward include: the 
unique ability of Islam to serve as an alternative source of identity during the Cold War 
and the North-South conflict and its function as a source of continuity that transcends 
ideological conflicts, as well as conflicts between new and traditional values and actors. 
To emphasize this point, the shortcomings of other ideologies in the Iranian context 
were discussed, particularly in light of the prevalence of nationalism and the inevitable 
association of ideologies such as socialism and constitutionalism with East and West, 
respectively. As a result of Islam’s position as an alternate source of identification, 
Benard and Khalilzad observe the “radicalization of tradition” (see chapter 4), which 
provides for the synthesis of new and old political philosophies in so far as they do not 
contradict each other. One of the products they they see resulting from this this process 
is the emergence of “religious nationalism.” It was also argued that Shari’ati’s political 
thought is a reflection of this process as well. The need to synthesize political ideas and 
movements seems also to have occurred to Khomeini, it is observed, as his concept of 
an Islamic government gradually transformed into an Islamic republic, with all its popular 
connotations. One of the responses of the Third World to the aggressive penetration by 
foreign powers was to use that foreign encroachment as a catalyst for collective action 
115
and internal alliances against the outside enemy. Another argument which was 
considered was that the rise of nationalism made a rejection of Islam, which might have 
otherwise been seen as backward or conservative, impossible, as Islam was perhaps 
the only local, organic political force or ideology. Furthermore, Shi’a Islam in Iran held a 
position that was unique relative to other Muslim countries. Shi’a Islam was and is by far 
the smaller of the two primary branches of Islam, and Iran had effectively become the 
center of the Shi’a world under the Safavid dynasty. Therefore, Shi’a nationalism was 
particularly Iranian, and also modern in a way that Sunni Islam never could be, because 
it was felt that Shi’a Islam belonged to Iran, the modern nation-state. The argument that 
Shi’a Islam’s independence from the state also played a role in its ability to assert itself 
politically during the revolution was also discussed. It was argued, on the one hand, that
the institutional independence from the state meant that the Shi’a were not reliant on the 
state for funds, and therefore had a greater freedom of action. Furthermore, Arjomand 
also argued that this independence may have induced a negative evaluation of the state 
on the part of some within the ulama. This independence also meant that as the ulama
sought public support they could legitimately claim that they were morally stronger 
because they had no political power and could therefore not be corrupted. It also 
manifested itself in a relative freedom from state scrutiny and repression. The extensive 
network of mosques over which the ulama presided also facilitated their ability to 
organize successfully and mobilize their followers. This efficient communications 
infrastructure may have also led other groups, who did not possess such mechanisms 
or whose tools of communication had been destroyed, to the ulama. Institutions of Shi’a 
culture also played an important role in the perpetuation of the protest movement that 
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led to the revolution. The politicization of the 40th-day mourning ceremonies is perhaps 
the best example of this. The availability of pre-existing Shi’a narratives of suffering and 
injustice, such as what Fischer calls the “Karbala paradigm” were also of considerable 
use to the Islamists, who were able to imbue the revolutionary movement with an 
Islamic vocabulary and an Islamic context. This is also evident in the model of the 
marja-e tqaqlid, or source of emulation. Shi’a Islam encourages each individual to select 
for him- or herself a marja whose rulings on all matters are binding for his followers. So, 
the clergy had an existing following, whom they had only to urge to join the protests, 
though it should be pointed out that such drastic measures would not always have been 
so willingly followed. It has also been observed that the religious institutions and popular 
religious leaders escaped the state’s repressive measures largely unscathed, and so, 
their movement never suffered from a loss of momentum the way others might have. 
Perhaps the most important features of political Shi’a Islam, however, were its history as 
a voice of opposition and criticism in modern Iranian history, and the fact that it did not 
yet have a political ideology or platform of its own. The ulama were remembered as the 
only political entity to have openly opposed the granting of the Tobacco Concession in 
1890 and were also known to have been integral to the success of the Constitutional 
Revolution. Their immediate opposition to the ‘White Revolution’ - although arguably 
mostly out of self-interest - was also not forgotten by the public, most of whom were 
eventually disappointed by the series of reforms. The clergy, and Khomeini in particular, 
therefore had credentials as an opposition group which no other faction could claim, 
which perhaps also explains why these groups largely aligned themselves with the 
ulama and not vice versa. It is also argued here that due to the absence of a developed 
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political platform, the Islamist movement was able to seize the initiative and tailor its 
narrative and platform to the popular grievances of the Iranian nation. As Abrahamian 
noted, that platform was based primarily on opposition to the Shah, the only political 
objective that could be considered nearly universal, and closely reflects the populism 
found in Third World Latin American countries.
Chapter 5 reviewed the relationship between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the 
United States of America and the perception of the nature of that relationship in Iran, as 
well as the vulnerability of the Shah’s claims to legitimacy. The origins of the Pahlavi 
dynasty were examined, as well we as those of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign itself. 
The role of foreign powers in bringing both to fruition severely undermined the Pahlavi 
dynasty’s ability to claim legitimacy, as it had been redefined during the Safavid era: the 
protection and advancement of the nation and of the faith. So, from the outset, the 
younger Pahlavi Shah would have to contend with challenges to his legitimacy and his 
nationalist credentials. US involvement in the coup that removed the popular Prime 
Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, and restored greater powers to the Shah would 
only further undermine his rule. The idea for the ‘White Revolution’ launched by the 
Shah in 1963 was largely believed to have come from Washington, while the Status of 
Forces Agreement of the next year that granted immunity to all US personnel in Iran 
provoked widespread outrage, articulated most forcefully by Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
was forced into exile. All of this served, however, to confirm the perception that the 
Shah was subservient to the US. It was also explored how the Shah sought to claim the 
title of nationalist by spurring a rise in the price of oil per barrel by OPEC at an already 
difficult time for the US economy. However, his mismanagement of these financial 
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resources led to a spike in inflation that caused a recession and led to the emergence of 
protests. Additionally, as discussed briefly in chapter 2, the Shah had to contend with an 
Iranian paranoia that ascribed every political action to the machinations of foreign 
powers; this belief is rooted in the actual interference in Iran by those same powers, 
though it is also certainly exaggerated. This exaggeration manifested itself in the 
reluctance of the Iranian public to recognize the leverage the Shah was able to exercise 
with the US after 1953. Regardless, “Iranians believed the central direction for the 
Shah’s policies originated in Washington.”207 Moreover, the younger Pahlavi also had to 
contend with an increasingly educated and politically conscious population, due, in no 
small part, to the reforms instituted by his father and which he dutifully continued.
In chapter 6, the focus changes from the cultural and historical structures that made the 
Islamic Revolution possible to the actual events that led to the abolition of the monarchy 
and its replacement by the Islamic Republic. This is done in the context of Keddie’s 
paradigm of the inverse correlation between strong government and ulama power. It is 
argued that under Reza Shah, the Pahlavi dynasty reversed the decline of the Iranian 
state, resulting in the loss of ulama power, despite that group’s marginalization by him. 
Reza Shah was able to strengthen the military, improve the state’s infrastructure, and 
establish a functioning bureaucracy. It was observed that his program of modernization 
suffered from three flaws, however: it was carried out too quickly to be as effective as 
possible; it was often superficial, even cosmetic; and, the state was built around the 
Shah himself. His own strength was reflected in the state; however, the occupation by 
the Allied forces during World War II exposed the relative weakness of Iran. The Shah 
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was forced to abdicate to his son, who, after more than a decade of relative negligence, 
began to consolidate power in much the same way his father had. However, his 
progressive alienation of every one of his traditional bases of power, and his failure to 
successfully acquire any new ones weakened his position. He was able to maintain his 
position, however, insulated by a powerful military and police, as well as revenues from 
the state-controlled oil industry. The concurrence of the election of Jimmy Carter, and 
the pressure felt by the Shah to relax political pressure as a result, and the recession in 
Iran, gradually exposed the Shah’s weakness, which manifested itself in the state as 
well. The Shah’s desire to rule was rooted in his self-deluded belief that he was widely 
loved and respected, rather than feared. As the revolution gained momentum and 
participation became almost universal, this myth seems to have collapsed, and the 
Shah effectively gave up. As Ansari has argued, the success of the revolution was 
“dependent ultimately on the actions and inactions of the one man who, by his own 
volition, formed the lynchpin of the Pahlavi state.”208 The role of Khomeini as a catalyst 
for the revolution and his ability to take advantage of processes and developments set 
in motion long before, is also discussed.
The Iranian Revolution, therefore, marks the culmination of each of the trends which the 
dissertation has sought to explore and to address. Set into motion by the weakness of 
the declining Qajar dynasty, the simultaneous growth of ulama power and the incursion 
into Iran by foreign powers resulted in a conflict over who was to fill the power vacuum 
created by the weakened government. The latter, meanwhile, generated a nationalism 
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that came to dominate Iranian politics through the present. The rise of the Iranian 
political consciousness, meanwhile, constituted a new political pressure on the Iranian 
monarchy which could be harnessed by other political actors. Populist nationalism 
appears to have been the most effective way of mobilizing the newly politically 
conscious public. 
Shi’a Islam, largely claimed by Iran as its own, was exceptionally well positioned to do 
so. Its status as a cultural institution protected it from state interference and repression, 
and its place in the structure and hierarchy of society meant that it was exceptionally 
well suited to lead a mass movement. Other political ideologies were too specific and 
could not command the broad support which Islam, with an exceptional political leader 
such as Khomeini, was able to. The ongoing perception that the Iranian state was being 
manipulated by foreign powers - not without an element of truth - thoroughly 
undermined the monarchy’s legitimacy. This is not to suggest that the Islamic 
Revolution, or indeed any revolution, in Iran was inevitable. Rather, it is hoped that a 
clear idea has emerged of the extraordinary coincidence of circumstances, including 
these trends and the catalysts in the form of the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the 
economic and political conditions at the time, and how these reflect historical and 
political developments without which it is unlikely that Iran’s Islamic Revolution would 
have occurred at all.
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